| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 國際經濟研究所 === 89 === In the previous studies, the causes of bank runs could be distinguished between the random-withdraws theory and the information-based theory. In this study we extend the Cooper and Ross（1998） framework which is a random-withdraws model to construct an information-based model. We find that bank runs is not a subgame perfect equilibrium in the random-withdraws framework, but with the concept of expected losses, there exist a subgame perfect equilibrium such as bank runs in this model. Moreover, by the illiquidity of the long run investment, we compute a threshold rate of bank runs in which bank runs would be triggered when the ratio of early withdrawing depositors excess this threshold rate. Finally, the reason of failing banks paid higher interest rates before bank runs is also analysed from the viewpoint of the depositor.
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