The Conception of Freedom in Sartre''s Being and Nothingness

• Main Authors: Chiou Yih Sen, 邱奕森
• Other Authors: Wing-chung Kwan
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2000
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/27873381991496096073

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 哲學研究所 === 88 === This thesis studies "whether the conception of ''freedom'' in Sartre''s Being and Nothingness can provide a person his own subjectivity in the lashes of values of plural cultures." Sartre confronted many insolvable ethical questions when he went through the world war Ⅱ. These questions made Sartre reconsider the relations between man and various values, and he tried to solve these questions. Sartre affirmed that man could use his conception of freedom to create his subjectivity and meaning of life in the lashes of values of plural cultures. However, this thesis tries to show that Sartre''s conception of freedom results in several difficulties: First, Sartre''s conception of freedom is restricted, not unlimited. Second, it is not primary. Third, it results in the difficulties of ethical subjectivism. They show that a man cannot create his subjectivity just by his conception of freedom. But they give rise to an alternative thinking. Since Sartre''s ontology is the foundation of his conception of freedom, and if Sartre''s conception of freedom results in the difficulties then it is reasonable to doubt that " whether Sartre''s ontology is partial to make his freedom problematic." This thesis discusses this question in the conclusion.