| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 哲學研究所 === 88 === Abstract
The main aim of this dissentation is trying to re-interpret, defend with clarify, and extend Russell''s distinction between referring and denoting. My arguments will be base on the corcordance of two different aspects of language, namely the truth and communication. In introduction, I will briefly give an account of these two aspects of language, and explain some relations between them. As my opnion the possible discordance between truth and communication forms the fundamental problem for the concept of referring. Therefore, in my consideration about theory of reference, the core task must be solve this discordance. In my first chapter, I am trying to re-interpret Frege and Russell forms this viewpoint. On the one hand, my approach can be justified by doing so； on the other hand, their achievement in the field of referring will be analysed and discussed more deeply by this way.
After re-interting Russell, in my chapter two, I attempt to respond criticism of Strawson, Donnellan and Kripke against Russell. If my interpretation stands, I think these scholars misunderstood the certal topic of Russell''s work since their ignorance of the concordance of truth and communication. For this I will provide some necessary darification and criticism. Beside clanfying Russell''s position negtively, I also try to introduce Evans'' theory of reference in my last chapter, to apply Russell''s concept of referring and denoting more widely. This part can also be considered as a new interpretation for Evans'' work, that is, a consequence of absorbing Frege''s concept o thought with Russell''s thinking.
In the conclusion, as well as a reflection on the fundmental problem mentioned above and on difficulties and limits of Russell''s thinking, I suggest that the connection between referring and understanding is a worthy topic to develop. It seems that there is a left room for the approach of studying the concordance and discordance between truth and communication.
Key words: Russell, Theory of Description, Theory of Reference
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