| Summary: | 碩士 === 靜宜大學 === 企業管理學系 === 87 === This research investigates earning management from the viewpoint of relative performance of two periods. The relative performance of two-period model, modified from the Defond & Park (1997) model, to examine whether the management manipulates earning due to threat of dismissal.
The management is the core in corporate operation, all important decisions are made by the management who is responsible for success and default on the corporate. So this study focus on job dismissal faced by the management, to know whether they smooth performance between two periods. To investigate whether relative good or bad performance between two periods effects discretionary accrual, which proxy earnings management. If the result is meet with the job dismissal hypothesis, occupied manager will be basis on self-interest to manage earnings in the situation there is relative good or bad performance between two periods.
Main results are as follows：
1、It is not significant, the relative performance of two
period’s original model, derived from the research of
Defond & Park (1997) model, to explained the phenomenon of
earnings management in Taiwan.
2、This research shows the management will manipulate earnings
for the relative good and relative bad performance between
two periods. The magnitude of earnings manipulation is
based on its relative performance between two periods.
3、There is relationship between earning management and
ownership structure. President has more motivation than
outer directors to manipulate earnings.
4、In word of the level of earnings management, it is not
consistence that more the ownership of the management, more
effective is. Sometimes there is deflection hypothesis.
Board of directors is consistent with the convergence of
interest hypothesis. President and chairman are not
consistent with the convergence of interest hypothesis.
5、There is job dismissal threat in president, not in board of
directors and chairman.
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