Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Failure - Experimental Results of the Tacit Coordination Game
碩士 === 國立臺灣科技大學 === 管理研究所企業管理學程 === 87 === Economics concerns the equilibrium status of economics. Normally, equilibrium belongs to a status that is not changed. When equilibrium is done, each economic unit has obtained the maximum utility of satisfy, then they will continue their same behavior and...
Main Authors: | Huang Chun Chieh, 黃俊傑 |
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Other Authors: | Gordon D. Chang |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
1999
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/64534921606364517189 |
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