Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Failure - Experimental Results of the Tacit Coordination Game

• Main Authors: Huang Chun Chieh, 黃俊傑
• Other Authors: Gordon D. Chang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 1999
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/64534921606364517189

碩士 === 國立臺灣科技大學 === 管理研究所企業管理學程 === 87 === Economics concerns the equilibrium status of economics. Normally, equilibrium belongs to a status that is not changed. When equilibrium is done, each economic unit has obtained the maximum utility of satisfy, then they will continue their same behavior and will not to deviate in this situation. In game theory, deductive is a good and useful tool to analyze. When a rational decision-maker faces an uncertainty, he or she will use deductive method the other decision makers’ strategy, and uses the results of predict to make own decisions in order to maximize his or her utility. It seems to be easy and reasonable to get the perfect equilibrium using deductive method, but is it true to a real world? This thesis will discuss that if uncertainty will influence decisions when rational decision-makers consider their strategies. To focus the analysis, this research consider the following tacit coordination game, which is a strategic form represented by John Bryant’s (1983) Keynesian coordination game. That model claims the “minimum rule” to be a factor of strategic uncertainty. This thesis uses experimental methods to run test. There are five experiments designed and conducted in this thesis in order to test if the different situations will influence the results of decision making. There are three main results on this thesis through the five experiments: 1. Decision-making is influenced by different situations in this model. 2. Strategic uncertainty and coordination failure are true in this model. 3. Deductive method can not provide a Pareto equilibrium in this model.