| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 87 === In this thesis, I consider the problem of private provision of public goods. If the private action of public good contribution can improve one''s prestige level, the prestige motivation should be an important factor in the decision of donating public goods. I assume that the utility level depends on one''s private consumption, public consumption, and prestige level. The prestige level is determined by the reporting policy. Three policies are considered here: no reporting, exact reporting, and category reporting. In this model, the Nash equilibrium exists under any of the three policies. However, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium only appears under no reporting and exact reporting.
I find that the Nash equilibrium quantity of public goods under exact reporting or category reporting may be less than that under no reporting in general. But if the marginal utility of prestige is independent of the private consumption and public consumption, the Nash equilibrium quantity of public goods under exact reporting or category reporting must be more than or equal to that under no reporting. Furthermore, this quantity can be increased if the fund-raiser adjusts the reporting categories suitably.
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