立法院委員會審查預算功能之研究

• Main Authors: HUANG WEN-YAN, 黃文彥
• Other Authors: 陳春生
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 1999
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/39490492672977085983

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 三民主義研究所 === 87 === Auditing the national budget is one of the two main functions of the Legislative Yuan. In practice, these functions are carried out by the committees within the Legislative Yuan. Recently, the performance of the committee has failed to meet the demands of an increasingly large government budget, resulting in a serious questioning of its professionalism as well as a loss in its authority. This thesis will discuss the reasons for the committee’s failure to function properly, as well as explain the pattern of the committee’s actions brought about by changes in the political climate. Suggestions to amend the workings of the committee will be given to hopefully help raise its level of efficiency and performance. Firstly, in light of the particular characteristics of Taiwan’s congressional and committee systems, the factors that affect the committee’s actions are outlined as follows: external factors, including political climate and societal conditions; internal factors, namely, those of the congressional institution, which include the Legislative Yuan’s budget auditing procedures, its committee forming procedures, and its culture of deliberation, etc. On the whole, during the process of budget formulations, members of the Legislative and Executive Yuan, political parties, interest groups, the media and electorates, are all able to affect the actions of the committee through a variety of mediums in an attempt to achieve an outcome toward their own ends. However, the designs and workings of formal and informal societal institutions are also important factors at play. To investigate the reasons for the failure of the committee to operate efficiently and properly, the author will, based on the research framework thus given, discuss the modes of interaction among the political actors, and between political actors and formal / informal institutions. By considering such factors as the interests of an electoral district, the uneven distribution of information, political party organizations, interactions between executive / legislative branches and informal institutions, coupled with statistical information and personal interviews, the author will analyze the legislative committee system in terms of its impacts on the budget process. Secondly, upon observing the political systems and the budget processes of the United States and Japan, and analyzing the institutional factors, political climate and societal conditions thereof, it is clear that the level of professionalism found in the two countries has yet to be reached in Taiwan’s congress, resulting inevitably in the lack of respect for the authority of the committee. This fact can be explained by the following phenomena: the system provides no incentives for committee members to be professional; executive / legislative members purposely give misinformation to disrupt the proper workings of the budget procedure; political parties strategically maneuver to overlook the need for professionalism in the committee; interest groups attempt to gain membership in the committee in order to exert their influence; unprofessional legislative members and the media distort the committee’s budgetary issues; conflicts of interest arise in the appeasement of electoral districts and the proper auditing of the budget; boundaries which separate the legislative branch, business groups and interest groups are blurred. Finally, given the above failings in the budget auditing system, this thesis provides six suggestions in an attempt to help improve the auditing function of the Budget Committee. These are: strengthen political party supervisory power; continue reforms in the budget process; provide mechanism for ruling and opposite parties to negotiate in advance on budget resolutions; establish a complete and professional committee staff; avoid conflicts of interest and provide conduit for public checks on congressional actions; establish procedures for mid- and long-term budget audits; strengthen the top-down budget auditing process.