A Study of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard under Deposit Insurance System in Taiwan-Empirical of Credit department of Farm''s Association
碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 農業經濟學系 === 87 === A Study of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard under Deposit Insurance System in Taiwan- Empirical of Credit department of Farm''s Association .We employ a probit regression model to estimated Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.And employ Factor Analysis、...
Main Author: | 莊于輝 |
---|---|
Other Authors: | 羅明哲 |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
1999
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52616266952324258531 |
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