A Study of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard under Deposit Insurance System in Taiwan-Empirical of Credit department of Farm''s Association

• Main Author: 莊于輝
• Other Authors: 羅明哲
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 1999
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52616266952324258531

碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 農業經濟學系 === 87 === A Study of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard under Deposit Insurance System in Taiwan－ Empirical of Credit department of Farm''s Association .We employ a probit regression model to estimated Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.And employ Factor Analysis、Principal Component Analysis to choice variable. Owing to Credit department of Farm''s Association is different from other''s financial institution,So we also estimated Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard from different niche (city mixed country) Credit department of Farm''s Association and local faction intervene Credit department of Farm''s Association''s bussiness viewpoint. The results of this research are as follows：1、the insured Credit department of Farm''s Association held lower「overdue loans / loans」 than uninsured ,so insured Credit department of Farm''s Association didn''t exist Adverse Selection.2、After insured the mean 「capital& reserve / assets」of Credit department of Farm''s Associations rose , so insured Credit department of Farm''s Association didn''t exist Moral Hazard.To all appearance Credit department of Farm''s Association didn''t exist Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.