| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 財務金融學系 === 86 === Title of Thesis：Entry Deterrence and The Banking Firm''s
Total Pages：57 Investment Decisions
－The Quasi-Competitive of Duopolistic Model
Key World： entry deterrence, quasi-competitive, duopolistic
deposit market, Brownian motion.
Name of Institute：Graduate Institute of Money, Banking＆
Finance, Tamkang
University
Graduate date：June 1997 Degree Conferred：
Master
Name of student：Wen-Jyh Guo Advisor：Dr. Jyh-Horng
Lin
郭 文 智
Abstract：
When the government deregulates the financial regulation caused
by financial liberalization , the entrant will have
more chance and ability to determine whether enter
banking industry or not . In this condition, it is important for
entrant''s investment decision to manage the buziness
of bank.
The present paper attempts to construct a dynamic theoretical
model of single incumbent-entrant interaction utilized
the suggests whether the excess capacity can constitute
entry deterrence or not by Spence (1977) and Veendorp. The paper
incroporates the assumption of the both bank deposit competition
conduct quasi- competitive style in the entrant''s
investment decision , discuss the case of capacity can be
reversed or not with deposit''s strategic complements or
substitutes in financial liberalization, how to effect the
both bank''s deposit by the change of external
environment and shock factor.
The main concluding remarks are described as follows：
1.In the case of quasi-competitive and deposit''s strategic
complements, whether capacity can be reversed or
not,
?the more stable the duopolistic deposit environment, the more
deposit both banks will increase. In the
meanwhile , the external factor of structural
environment has much more significant impact on the deposit
market than
the internal factor of deposit conjectual variation.
?The deposit of both bank will increase if the external shock
becomes significantly violent.
2.In the case of quasi-competitive and deposit''s strategic
substitutes, ?If capacity reversed
costlessly , the more stable the duopolistic deposit market
environment , the incumbent''s deposit will increase and the
entrant''s deposit will decrease. If capacity
reversed not costlessly , the more stable the duopolistic
deposit market environment, the entrant''s deposit will increase
and the incumbent''s deposit will decrease.
?The external shock becomes significantly violent, the entrant''
s deposit will increase and the incumbent''s
deposit will decrease if capacity reversed not
costlessly .
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