| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學系 === 86 === The main purpose of this research is to investigate economic
consequences of contest for board director seats of publicly
listed companies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. By
examining the changes of share price and
trading volume for the sample companies selected from
the period of 1991 to 1996 (Group A), this research
empirically tests and clarifies the informational effect of such
contest from different dimensions, such as contest intensity,
contest results, and types of shareholders'' meetings. Given
that ROC Securities and Futures Commision amended
the regulations of circulation of proxy letters
in 1996, this study also applies the test procedure to the
sample companies selected starting from 1997 (Group
B) to study the impact of the amendment.
The findings from the empirical study can be summarized as
follows:
1. Regarding the annual regular shareholders'' meetings (ARM),
the incidence of the contest for board directors'' position is
negatively related to shareholders'' wealth for both Groups A
and B, and the negative return on share prices for both
groups are positively related to contest intensity and number
of director seats seized by the dissident.
2. For temporary shareholders'' meetings (TSM), occurrence of
the contest imposes a positive but not significant effect on
shareholders'' wealth for Group A, which results mainly
from intensive contest and the dissident''s participation in
the company''s board of directors.
3. The trends of trading volume for Groups A and B around
ARM are consistent, to some extent, with the hypotheses this
research proposes. That is, their trading volumes were higher
than normal before the record date but the trend reversed
thereafter. However, the trend of trading volume is not
statistically related to contest intensity and number of
director seats seized by the dissident. Thus a further
investigation is needed. Moreover, the trends for the samples
around TSM, except the mild contest subsample, are not
consistent with the hypotheses.
|
|---|
