| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 企業管理研究所 === 86 === Previous studies document that the mean initial return of IPOs ( initial public offerings ) is significantly positive. Several literature tends to attribute the positive mean initial return to the underpricing of IPOs.However, underpricing is costly for issuing firms. Many researches attempt to provide reasonable explanations for the anomaly. However, there is no single theory which fully explains the underpricing of IPOs. In other words, underpricing phenomenon is attributed to several factors. In this thesis, I tryto find out another factor to further investigate the underpricing phenomenon. The empirical methodology is based on the agency theory, signalling hypothesis, and corporate control theory. We measure the relationship between the board ownership and the underpricing of IPOs. The sample consists of 162 initial public offerings listed from January 1991 to October 1997. The empirical results show that there is a significantly negativerelationship between the board ownership and the underpricing of IPOs.With the aspect of corporate control, I conjecture the non-monotonic linear and the non-linear relationship between the board ownership and the underpricing of IPOs. Nevertheless, the empirical results do not support thenon-linear relationship. I further decompose the board ownership variable into two variables. One is the ownership retained by the chairperson of the board and that by president. The other one is the ownership retained byother members of the board. I find that the ownership retained by the chairperson of the board and by the president is more influenceable on the underpricing of the offerings than the ownership retained by other members of the board. Finally, this thesis also indicates that the extent of underpricing of IPOs is negatively related to the ownership retained by the chairperson of the board and by president, and to the ownership retained by the institutional investors.
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