Research and Development,Technological Spillover Effects and Government''s Policies

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系 === 85 === Research and Development (R&D) is the main resource for technologyadvancement.Due to the spillover effect form firm''s R&D,R&D resources tend tobranch out.Government policy now can motivate...

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Main Authors: Ho, Chi-Ruey, 何啟瑞
Other Authors: Chiou Jiunn-Rong
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 1997
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32148457694919322802
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spelling ndltd-TW-085TKU003350042016-07-01T04:15:57Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32148457694919322802 Research and Development,Technological Spillover Effects and Government''s Policies 研究發展、技術外溢與政府政策 Ho, Chi-Ruey 何啟瑞 碩士 淡江大學 產業經濟學系 85 Research and Development (R&D) is the main resource for technologyadvancement.Due to the spillover effect form firm''s R&D,R&D resources tend tobranch out.Government policy now can motivate firm''s R&D indination throughdifferent industrial policies,so that individual firm R&D benefits our societythe most.Therefore,researches about R&D spillover effects and governmentindustrial policies are the major course of industrial organization theorem. First of all,this article presents a simple Cournot duopoly model todiscuss the best suitable policy government should take under different firm''scompetitiveness.Research of this artical shows the following conclusion:(1)When firm''s competitiveness becomes individual R&D and output competition,government will subsidize the firm''s output.However,R&D spillover effects willaffect the government''s direction of R&D policy. (2)When firm'' scompetitiveness becomes cooperative R&D and output competition, government willsubsidize both firm''s R&D and their output phase.(3)When firm''scompetitiveness becomes cooperative R&D and output collaboration,governmentwill still subsidize cooperative firm''s output,but will not interfere withcooperative firm''s R&D. Secondly, this article also discusses our government''s most suitableindustrial policy and trading policy when our firm proceed with tradingcompetition in the third country and compare our analysis with Spencer &Brander (1983) conclusion.The result are: (1)When our government policy isonly towards our firm''s R&D,our government will subsidize R&D unless R&Dspillover is 0.5. (2)When both governments take R&D policy towards the 2ndcountry''s firms, the governments both provide R&D subsidiary.If bothgovernments'' goal is maximum joint social welfare,R&D spillover will affectthe two government''s direction of most suitable R&D policy.(3)When ourgovernment also considers taking exporting policy toward our firm,thisresearch points out that when R&D spillover is lesser,our government collectsR& D taxes from our firm, but provide exporting subsidiary for theiroutput.However,when R&D spillover is greater,our government policy will beaffected by the firm''s R&D unit cost. Chiou Jiunn-Rong 邱俊榮 1997 學位論文 ; thesis 75 zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系 === 85 === Research and Development (R&D) is the main resource for technologyadvancement.Due to the spillover effect form firm''s R&D,R&D resources tend tobranch out.Government policy now can motivate firm''s R&D indination throughdifferent industrial policies,so that individual firm R&D benefits our societythe most.Therefore,researches about R&D spillover effects and governmentindustrial policies are the major course of industrial organization theorem. First of all,this article presents a simple Cournot duopoly model todiscuss the best suitable policy government should take under different firm''scompetitiveness.Research of this artical shows the following conclusion:(1)When firm''s competitiveness becomes individual R&D and output competition,government will subsidize the firm''s output.However,R&D spillover effects willaffect the government''s direction of R&D policy. (2)When firm'' scompetitiveness becomes cooperative R&D and output competition, government willsubsidize both firm''s R&D and their output phase.(3)When firm''scompetitiveness becomes cooperative R&D and output collaboration,governmentwill still subsidize cooperative firm''s output,but will not interfere withcooperative firm''s R&D. Secondly, this article also discusses our government''s most suitableindustrial policy and trading policy when our firm proceed with tradingcompetition in the third country and compare our analysis with Spencer &Brander (1983) conclusion.The result are: (1)When our government policy isonly towards our firm''s R&D,our government will subsidize R&D unless R&Dspillover is 0.5. (2)When both governments take R&D policy towards the 2ndcountry''s firms, the governments both provide R&D subsidiary.If bothgovernments'' goal is maximum joint social welfare,R&D spillover will affectthe two government''s direction of most suitable R&D policy.(3)When ourgovernment also considers taking exporting policy toward our firm,thisresearch points out that when R&D spillover is lesser,our government collectsR& D taxes from our firm, but provide exporting subsidiary for theiroutput.However,when R&D spillover is greater,our government policy will beaffected by the firm''s R&D unit cost.
author2 Chiou Jiunn-Rong
author_facet Chiou Jiunn-Rong
Ho, Chi-Ruey
何啟瑞
author Ho, Chi-Ruey
何啟瑞
spellingShingle Ho, Chi-Ruey
何啟瑞
Research and Development,Technological Spillover Effects and Government''s Policies
author_sort Ho, Chi-Ruey
title Research and Development,Technological Spillover Effects and Government''s Policies
title_short Research and Development,Technological Spillover Effects and Government''s Policies
title_full Research and Development,Technological Spillover Effects and Government''s Policies
title_fullStr Research and Development,Technological Spillover Effects and Government''s Policies
title_full_unstemmed Research and Development,Technological Spillover Effects and Government''s Policies
title_sort research and development,technological spillover effects and government''s policies
publishDate 1997
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32148457694919322802
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