Interest Conflict Between Shareholder and Debtholder of a

• Main Authors: Chen, Yuen-Lien, 陳岳連
• Other Authors: Jyh-Hong Lin
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 1997
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/17870115725231239629

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 國際貿易學系 === 85 === nternational BusinessGraduate Date：June,1997 Degree Confer red：MasterName of Student：(英文)Yueh-Lien Chen Advisor：Dr. Jyh-Hong Lin (中文) 陳岳連 林志鴻 Abstract： The viewpoint in industry management is devoted to pursuing the wealth-maximizing in shareholders. However, bank financial leverage is higher than produc firm because of its financial-service attribution. Bank also faces to the withdrawi ng right randomly that not only deposit, loan, investment decision but also op eration effect is affected. According to these reasons, bank has to emphasis o n depositor right. The thesis talks about - As a bank manager, which one is wo rth to pursue. The wealth-maximizing in shareholders ? The wealth-maximizing i n debtholders? The paper is based on the local duopolistic bank firm model. Under the hypothesis of imperfect deposit market, the thesis talks about the interest conflict between shareholders and debtholders resulting from the diff erence in a bank management object as a viewpoint in the limited-liability eff ect of 100% financial leverage usage. The thesis also discusses the interest-c onflict effect for the unsure factors. The paper concludes that it exists t he interest conflict between shareholders and depositors. In addition , the op timal amount of deposit of the bank who pursues the maximum wealth in sharehol ders is greater than that of the bank who pursues the maximum wealth in debtho lders . The result illustrates that a bank manager may keep the active attitud e under the goal pursuing the maximum wealth in shareholders.