Bank Competition, and Monitoring Efficiency in a Multiple-Lender-Single-Borrower Credit Market Equilibrium

• Main Authors: Wang, Yi-Chen, 汪逸真
• Other Authors: Chyi-Mei Chen
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 1997
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/75765923918028931550

博士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學研究所 === 85 === Single or multiple, multiple or syndicate,the type of bank financing is t he most important issues when firm uses bank debt to finance the investment pr ojects. There are two parts in this paper, the first discusses that whether t he single- or the multiple-bank financing is firm preferrable, and the over mo nitoring problem under multiple-bank financing. The second part asked that fi rm''s financing choice is of multiple-bank or of syndication when firm owns a l arge investment project. The first part shows that: since the cost of moni toring under information asymmetry, and the bank''s bargaining power over firm'' s project NPV are non-trivial, firm prefers multiple-bank financing. Through firm''s self information revealing process and the sequential finance-asking by firm, the over monitor-ing problem of multiple-bank financing can be solved. The second part shows that: bank might under monitors project proceedings u nder syndication financing; while the over-monitoring or under-monitoring prob lem happens of multiple-bank financing. Firm uses syndica-tion financing only if the credit rating of firm is between average, and the bank''s bargaining pow er is not high enough; otherwise, firm asks for multiple-bank financing. Fina lly, the under-monitoring problem of syndiation financingis less severed when leading bank rewards private benefit from lending only if project succeed and be re-financed by syndication.