A Study of Mainland China''s Politico-Economic Relations between Central and Local Governments

• Main Authors: Pan, Fu-Sing, 潘扶興
• Other Authors: Chen, Te-Sheng
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 1996
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/92730995389640607084

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 中國大陸研究所 === 84 === 　　Prior to the adoption of the "reform and opening-up policy" by the PRC government, although the relationship between central and local sectors had experienced several adjustments, regions basically confined in the framework of "democratic centralis" - -a system which bases political power in the central government to ensure unified leadership, while economically giving full play to local initiative and allowing local sectors to enjoy a relatively autonomous status. Yet, when the economic decentralization process resulted in economic chaos or national economic policy became a tool in political struggles among ranking officials, economic relationship between central and local sectors has bogged down in a repeated circle of decentralization-centralization-redecentralization. 　　After the implementation of the "reform and opening-up policy" in 1979, Beijing''s continual transfer of economic power to local government has not only brought about rapid development in local economics but also resulted in the rise of localism. This has weakened the central government''s control over the national economy and changed te economic relationship between central and local sectors. The issue of whether changes in the economic domain have extended to political sphere, or even if this will lead to a crisis in which the PRC will split has become a popular subject in the realm of academic research. Consequently, this thesis will give an analytical account of the above questions and hopefully provide research information for outside references as well as applications. 　　Approaches adopted in this study include documentary analysis and historical research as well s elite study. The following have bee obtained : 　　1.Under egocentric motivations, "selfish departmentalism" of the "feudal economy" at local levels has arisen. As a result, many decentralizing measures adopted by the PRC central were only temporary remedies and their outcomes are yet to be observed. 　　2.Interactions between central and local sectors have gradually shifted from the previous dominant one-way commanding mode into a two-way negotiationg one. Furthermore, there has been a tendency of local sectors evolving toward forming unified groups to bargain with the central government. 　　3.After the CPC''s 12th National Congress, because the proportion of local cadres involved in the Political Bureau''s Policy-making increased, local sector''s influence over the government''s policy decisions has accordingly increased. In the process of policy-making, Beijing must give consideration to local sectors'' interests. 　　4.In order to cope with surging localism, the PRC central government, through manipulation of persommel administrative measures such as discharge, exchange, adjustment and prmotion, etc., has been constantly and firmly imposing control over arrangements of local leading cadres so that the possibility of forming "independent kingdoms" in local sectors can be dramatically reduced. 　　5.At the present stage, there is no such imminent crisis of local sectors challenging the central government. In the near future, the emertence of political feudalism among local sectors is not feasible.