| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 國際事務與戰略研究所 === 84 === This essay attempt to discuss about deterrence strategy, and
try to builda deterrence model for ROC. The development of
deterrence theory, and thus ofthe whole literature on
deterrence, hinges on the distinction between deterrenceby
denial/defense, and deterrence by retaliation/punishment. In the
west, and particularlyin the U. S., thinking about deterrence
developed initially out of enthusiasm for the new strategic
possibilities of deterrence by retaliation.Much of deterrence
theory and literature since the first flourish of enthusiasmfor
pure retaliation strategies, deterrence theory has come under
sustainedpressure to incorporate more and more elements of
denial. Western thinking is now spilt between those who still
favor a deterrence strategy predominantlybased on the logic of
retaliation, and those who wish to see the logic of denialgiven
priority. The evolution of deterrence theory in the West
therefore now covers the whole range of issues arising from the
two different approaches to deterrence, and interplay between
them. The term deterrence is appropriate even for the stronger
denial views, because the overarching threat of
nucleardevastation makes war avoidance the central priority for
both stands of thought. So, in this essay discuss theory include
maximum deterrence and minimum deterrence, then to link them
together for our deterrence model.
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