| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟研究所 === 83 === In this paper we present a signaling ,based on ideas of Esther
G al-Or ,in which both the price and the level of warranties
are ch oice variables and the warranties be used as signals for
the init ially unobservable durability of the goods .We
demonstrate throug h an example that in oligapolistic model ,it
is only in special c ase that warranties can serve as signal of
quality .The provisio n of warranties can serve as a signal of
durability only in cases in which the intrinsic attributes of
products are widely enough and the period the consumers make
their buying decision are not t oo long .If the intrinsic
attributes of producta are too clustere d ,the provision of
warranties can not serve as a signal of durab ility .When the
intrinsic attribtes of products are very far apar t ,whether
the provision of warranties can serve as a signal of d
urability or not depend on the period the consumers make their
b uying decision .If the period are not too long ,the provision
of warranties can serve as a signal of durability ,otherwise
,the pr ovision of warranties can not serve as a signal of
durability .We also demonstrate that when the provision of
warranties can not s erve as a signal of durability and the
period the consumers make their buying decision are not too
long ,the provision of warranti es will not causes the signal
cost.
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