| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 美國研究所 === 83 === Based on the Literature Survey Method, this thesis analyzes how
the U. S. Congress oversees the Central Intelligence Agency(
CIA). The focus of this study is as follows： 1. The
development of interrelations between Congress and CIA， and
the set-up of congressional intelligence committees and
oversight models. 2. The legal foundation for covert actions，
the major acts for relative congressional oversight, the
conflict between Congress and Executive Branch regarding covert
action. 3. The role of Congress in the exercise of oversight of
CIA, and how to improve it. The findings of this study are as
follows: 1. The Constitution is the supreme law governing the
interaction between Congress and CIA, and therefore in settling
any disputes between them. 2. How the Congress exercises its
power of oversight largely depends upon international
conditions and whether the CIA is troubled by scandales of
unlawful covert action or inappropriate management. It fits the
concept of stimulus-response model. 3. In terms of secrecy,
Congress and the CIA have different perceptions and
interpretations. This leads to constant battles over the
prospect of covert action and budget. In summary, the CIA,
faced with growing pressures of participation and openness in
the aftermath of the Cold War, must be trustful with Congress；
Congress must better its intelligence committees to be
responsible and disciplinary ones on which a solid and sound
foundation of interreaction can be erected.
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