| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中央大學 === 哲學研究所 === 83 === The subject of this dissertion is about the conflict between
Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism. By showing that moral facts
are different facts relative to the different kinds of moarl
behavior, I assert that they are both correct theories which
describ different moral facts relative to different kinds of
moral behavior. In this away ,I resolve the complicated pro-
blems which have bothered the all meta-ethical philosophers
hitherto :the Is/Ought question and the open-question argu-
ment. But besides the theoretical conflict between this two
kinds of meta-ethical theories,I pointed out that there is
still another kinds of conflict ,not theoretical but prac-
tical. The practical conflict we can represent it by arguing
the question about 'what does morality should be' and differs
from the theoretical conflict repressented by arguing 'what
does morality actually be'.
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