| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 82 === In theory, corporate boards of directors provide a primary
mechanism for solving agency problems. In practice, many boards
of directors are controlled by family members or powerful
managers.In the absence of independence, the effectiveness of
boards is criticized. The purpose of this study is to examine
the relationship between earnings manipulation and the
charateristics of boards. In this study, the charateristics of
a board under investigation consist of five items: (1)
independent board leadership ---- whether or not the chairman
(or his close relative) serves as president (2) inside
directors (3) family related directors (4) institutional
directors (5) the family structure of a board. Discretionary
accrual and nonoperating items in income statements are used as
proxies of earnings manipulation. Wilcoxon two sample test,
analysis of variance and multiple regression test are performed
to test the hypothesis developed by this study and to derive
the conclusion. The findings of this study are as follows. The
independence of board leadership affects earnings manipulation
significantly. The percentage of inside directors in a board is
negatively related to the earnings manipulation.Both family-
related and institutional directors affect earnings
manipulation but the direction of their relationship depends on
the situation faced by individual firm. The relationship of
family structure and earnings manipulation is unclear.
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