Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility
In contrast to his rationalist predecessors, Kant insists that feeling has a pos- itive role to play in moral life. But the exact nature of this role is far from clear. As much as Kant insists that moral action must proceed from a feeling of respect, he maintains with equal insistence that the objec...
Main Author: | Ware, Owen |
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Other Authors: | Franks, Paul |
Language: | en_ca |
Published: |
2010
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1807/26496 |
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