Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Quality of Will Approach
My central aim in the dissertation is to defend an account of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility that distinguishes culpable ignorance from non-culpable ignorance. The view that I defend is that ignorance is culpable just when an agent flouts or ignores moral reasons that underlie her...
Main Author: | Robichaud, Philip |
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Other Authors: | Sher, George |
Format: | Others |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2012
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1911/64675 |
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