Instability in competition : hotelling re-reconsidered
In this paper we show that Puu (2002) does not provide a stable solution to the location game, according to his own definition of stability. If the usual two-stage game is considered, where in the first stage a location is chosen once and forever, and in the second stage prices are determined, the e...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | English |
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Universität Potsdam
2005
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| Online Access: | http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-14299 http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2007/1429/ |
| Summary: | In this paper we show that Puu (2002) does not provide a stable solution to the location game, according to his own definition of stability. If the usual two-stage game is considered, where in the first stage a location is chosen once and forever, and in the second stage prices are determined, the equilibrium proves stable for a sizeable interval of parameters, however. Even though this procedure is most common in analyzing Hotelling's location problem, it is not satisfying because it exhibits an inconsistent informational structure. The search for a better concept of stability is imperative. |
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