Bargaining structure and regional unemployment insurance

• Main Author: Sanner, Helge
• Format: Others
• Language: English
• Published: Universität Potsdam 2001
• Subjects: Economics
• Online Access: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus-13747; http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2007/1374/

This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the la- bor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self-financing unemployment insurance (UI) for workers, firms, and with reference to an efficiency criterion. For this purpose, we respectively nu- merically compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.