| Summary: | <p> In this thesis, my aim is to weaken and dismantle two powerful objections to the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument. The first objection arises from causal closure principles. While there are many types of causal closure principles, causal closures principles hold that the universe is causally closed and that all physical effects have, at least a sufficient, physical cause. Given causal closure, we would not need to appeal to an immaterial entity, such as God, to explain the material universe. I hold that using causal closure principles against the cosmological argument is problematic, because we have insufficient reason to endorse causal closure principles. The second objection I will address is Hume's objection that the material universe can be the necessary being that is referred to in the Cosmological Argument, and, thus, God is unnecessary. I hold that if the material universe is necessary then it also needs to be eternal. Given that the material universe is made up of contingent entities, there are a number of logical and conceptual difficulties with the material universe being eternal.</p>
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