| Summary: | <p> The issue of southern Thailand becoming the next battleground for international <i> jihadist</i> terrorist organizations—such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or Jemaah Islamiyah—has reemerged as a prominent security concern following the defeats sustained by ISIS in the Middle East and the dispersion of its fighting force. While the prospect was hotly debated a decade ago, the majority of contemporary scholarship contends that <i> jihadism</i> will find little audience with the Malay Muslims in Thailand’s Deep South, whose Shafi’i population does not espouse the conservative Salafist beliefs underlying global <i>jihad</i>—a religiously-charged violent campaign against <i>infidels</i> (non-believers), <i> munafik</i> (traitorous Muslims), and bastions of state secularism and Western liberal values. It is furthermore believed that because southern Thailand’s armed groups are fighting a nationalist struggle for independence, as opposed to fighting for more ideological reasons, they would not be amenable to <i>jihadist</i> involvement in their conflict. </p><p> Although it is true that Malay-Muslim militants in Thailand have declined offers of foreign fighters from international terrorist organizations, the cooperation between various separatist movements in Mindanao and global <i> jihadist</i> groups reveals that ethno-nationalism and ideological dissonance are insufficient causes for a rejection of <i>jihadism</i>. Rather, I argue that secessionists develop ties with <i>jihadist</i> groups when they are in need of political, financial, or military support they cannot secure from a legal entity, such as a state. This often occurs when one militant faction breaks away from its state-sponsored parent group following the signing of a peace deal it considers unappealing. Insurgent groups in Thailand have been inclined to distance themselves from <i>jihadism</i> because they have already acquired state patronage from Malaysia, and association with terrorist organizations would likely undermine that relationship. Strategic decisions to cooperate with <i>jihadist</i> organizations are thus executed according to a cost-benefit analysis and are not exclusively determined by ideological predilections.</p><p>
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