Clinging to Power: Authoritarian Leaders and Coercive Effectiveness
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Wright State University / OhioLINK
2021
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| Online Access: | http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1629981480039829 |
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ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-wright16299814800398292021-11-03T05:17:21Z Clinging to Power: Authoritarian Leaders and Coercive Effectiveness Wolfe, Christian J. Comparative International Relations Middle Eastern History Political Science Authoritarianism coercion coercive effectiveness praetorian guards legitimacy institutionalism nationalism personalism authoritarian force tactics democracy China Syria Xi Jinping Assad Syrian Republican Guard Chinese Communist Party Single-party Ba'athism. This study identifies three tactics authoritarian leaders use to attempt to effectively coerce their citizens without losing power: 1) performance legitimacy, 2) nationalist legitimacy, and 3) institutional legitimacy. To demonstrate these tactics of what I call “coercive effectiveness,” the author employs a most-different-systems analysis on the regimes of Xi Jinping (2012 2015) and Bashar al-Assad (2000-2004). The author finds that coercion is more likely to be effective under the following conditions: 1) when leaders use economic performance and institutionalist strategies rather than nationalist tactics, 2) when an authoritarian leader climbs the ladder to power rather than inheriting leadership and 3) when a regime is structured around the party rather than those centered on an individual leader. These findings allow policy makers to make more informed decisions for interacting with leaders. For example, the more that a regime centralizes its power, the more likely they will lose their grip on coercion by making themselves the sole target for blame. 2021-09-01 English text Wright State University / OhioLINK http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1629981480039829 http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1629981480039829 unrestricted This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws. |
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NDLTD |
| language |
English |
| sources |
NDLTD |
| topic |
Comparative International Relations Middle Eastern History Political Science Authoritarianism coercion coercive effectiveness praetorian guards legitimacy institutionalism nationalism personalism authoritarian force tactics democracy China Syria Xi Jinping Assad Syrian Republican Guard Chinese Communist Party Single-party Ba'athism. |
| spellingShingle |
Comparative International Relations Middle Eastern History Political Science Authoritarianism coercion coercive effectiveness praetorian guards legitimacy institutionalism nationalism personalism authoritarian force tactics democracy China Syria Xi Jinping Assad Syrian Republican Guard Chinese Communist Party Single-party Ba'athism. Wolfe, Christian J. Clinging to Power: Authoritarian Leaders and Coercive Effectiveness |
| author |
Wolfe, Christian J. |
| author_facet |
Wolfe, Christian J. |
| author_sort |
Wolfe, Christian J. |
| title |
Clinging to Power: Authoritarian Leaders and Coercive Effectiveness |
| title_short |
Clinging to Power: Authoritarian Leaders and Coercive Effectiveness |
| title_full |
Clinging to Power: Authoritarian Leaders and Coercive Effectiveness |
| title_fullStr |
Clinging to Power: Authoritarian Leaders and Coercive Effectiveness |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Clinging to Power: Authoritarian Leaders and Coercive Effectiveness |
| title_sort |
clinging to power: authoritarian leaders and coercive effectiveness |
| publisher |
Wright State University / OhioLINK |
| publishDate |
2021 |
| url |
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1629981480039829 |
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AT wolfechristianj clingingtopowerauthoritarianleadersandcoerciveeffectiveness |
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