An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents

Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Chandrasekar, Swathi
Language:	English
Published:	Wright State University / OhioLINK 2017
Subjects:	Electrical Engineering Differential game theory Optimal control Game theory Nash equilibrium
Online Access:	http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1503716818890551

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spelling	ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-wright15037168188905512021-08-03T07:03:57Z An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents Chandrasekar, Swathi Electrical Engineering Differential game theory Optimal control Game theory Nash equilibrium The thesis is aimed at developing optimal defensive strategies that dissuade an attacker from engaging a defender while simultaneously persuading the attacker to retreat. A two-player Engage or Retreat differential game is developed in which one player represents a mobile attacker and the other player represents a mobile defender. Both players are modeled as massless particles moving with constant velocity. The choice to terminate the game in engagement or retreat lies with the attacker. The defender indirectly influences the choice of the attacker by manipulating the latter's utility function. In other words, the defender co-operates with the attacker so that retreat appears to be the best option available.The solution to the differential game is obtained by solving two related optimization problems namely the Game Of Engagement and Optimal Constrained Retreat. In the Game of Engagement, the attacker terminates the game by capturing the defender.In the Optimal Constrained Retreat, a value function constraint is imposed which deters the attacker's retreat trajectory from entering into a region where it may lead to engagement. Such regions where constrained retreat occurs are known as escort regions. The solutions to these two problems are used to construct the global equilibrium solutions to the Engage or Retreat differential game.The global equilibrium solution divides the admissible state space into two regions that contain qualitatively different equilibrium control strategies. Numerical solutions are included to support the theory presented. 2017-09-01 English text Wright State University / OhioLINK http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1503716818890551 http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1503716818890551 unrestricted This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws.
collection	NDLTD
language	English
sources	NDLTD
topic	Electrical Engineering Differential game theory Optimal control Game theory Nash equilibrium
spellingShingle	Electrical Engineering Differential game theory Optimal control Game theory Nash equilibrium Chandrasekar, Swathi An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents
author	Chandrasekar, Swathi
author_facet	Chandrasekar, Swathi
author_sort	Chandrasekar, Swathi
title	An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents
title_short	An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents
title_full	An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents
title_fullStr	An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents
title_full_unstemmed	An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents
title_sort	engage or retreat differential game with mobile agents
publisher	Wright State University / OhioLINK
publishDate	2017
url	http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=wright1503716818890551
work_keys_str_mv	AT chandrasekarswathi anengageorretreatdifferentialgamewithmobileagents AT chandrasekarswathi engageorretreatdifferentialgamewithmobileagents
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An Engage or Retreat differential game with Mobile Agents

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