Finding Useful Concepts of Representation in Cognitive Neuroscience: A new tactic for addressing dynamical critiques of representational models of cognition, action, and perception
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University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK
2019
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ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-ucin15718337176131812021-08-03T07:13:05Z Finding Useful Concepts of Representation in Cognitive Neuroscience: A new tactic for addressing dynamical critiques of representational models of cognition, action, and perception Martin, Jonathan Cognitive Therapy Cognitive Science Philosophy Neuroscience Cognitive Neuroscience Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Neuroscience Since Timothy van Gelder's 1995 paper “What Might Cognition be if not Computation?” there has been a growing distrust of representational accounts of cognition, most notably from proponents of relatively new programs like dynamical systems theory and ecological/embodied approaches to cognition. Some advocates of these programs have argued that the concept of “representation” is deeply flawed – does little explanatory work, prejudices what is researched and how results are interpreted, and loses sight of the complex interactions that hold between agents and their environments. In this dissertation, I will not try to challenge these claims. Instead, I will argue that responses from defenders of representational modeling often fail to adequately meet these challenges, underestimate their insights, and have a tendency to react by redefining “representation” in such a way that it loses its explanatory significance. Although I believe that the ultimate shape and utility of representational models of cognition will only be revealed in the course of doing science, I will advocate a new tack for defending representational modeling. I begin by acknowledging that representational terminology is indeed used inconsistently, and sometimes without warrant or explanatory power. Next, I examine cases from the cognitive neuroscience to try to show that we can distinguish between explanations whose representational features are closely tied to their explanatory ambitions and those that are not. I will argue that the representationalist should emphasize that information-processing solutions are contingent strategies available to organisms for producing adaptive behavior – as are varieties of synergistic agent-environmental coupling – and, therefore, there should be ways of marshaling evidence for or against the hypothesis that any particular cognitive/perceptual capacity is the result of a representational solution. She can then point out that explanatory representational models in neuroscience provide concrete examples of the kinds of empirical considerations and observations that can be used to motivate attributions of representational significance. They do so by bringing together disparate nervous systems and their components under reoccurring principles of anatomical organization, processing strategies, encoding methods, etc., and these produce testable empirical predictions, suggest interventions, unify phenomena as instances of a more general pattern, and exemplify other commonly lauded scientific virtues. A defense of representational modeling should demonstrate that some of our best explanations in cognitive neuroscience do make central use of representational theorizing for securing their explanatory goals. This can be done while also admitting that there may be many cases where organisms adopted non-representational solutions to navigating their environment. Adjusting metaphysical definitions of “representation” to include even apparently non-representational processes is unconvincing and fails to appreciate the reasons that animate representational explanations. 2019 English text University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1571833717613181 http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1571833717613181 unrestricted This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: some rights reserved. It is licensed for use under a Creative Commons license. Specific terms and permissions are available from this document's record in the OhioLINK ETD Center. |
| collection |
NDLTD |
| language |
English |
| sources |
NDLTD |
| topic |
Cognitive Therapy Cognitive Science Philosophy Neuroscience Cognitive Neuroscience Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Neuroscience |
| spellingShingle |
Cognitive Therapy Cognitive Science Philosophy Neuroscience Cognitive Neuroscience Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Neuroscience Martin, Jonathan Finding Useful Concepts of Representation in Cognitive Neuroscience: A new tactic for addressing dynamical critiques of representational models of cognition, action, and perception |
| author |
Martin, Jonathan |
| author_facet |
Martin, Jonathan |
| author_sort |
Martin, Jonathan |
| title |
Finding Useful Concepts of Representation in Cognitive Neuroscience: A new tactic for addressing dynamical critiques of representational models of cognition, action, and perception |
| title_short |
Finding Useful Concepts of Representation in Cognitive Neuroscience: A new tactic for addressing dynamical critiques of representational models of cognition, action, and perception |
| title_full |
Finding Useful Concepts of Representation in Cognitive Neuroscience: A new tactic for addressing dynamical critiques of representational models of cognition, action, and perception |
| title_fullStr |
Finding Useful Concepts of Representation in Cognitive Neuroscience: A new tactic for addressing dynamical critiques of representational models of cognition, action, and perception |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Finding Useful Concepts of Representation in Cognitive Neuroscience: A new tactic for addressing dynamical critiques of representational models of cognition, action, and perception |
| title_sort |
finding useful concepts of representation in cognitive neuroscience: a new tactic for addressing dynamical critiques of representational models of cognition, action, and perception |
| publisher |
University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| url |
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1571833717613181 |
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