Legalized Rent-Seeking: How Dictators Use Civil Courts to Manage Corruption
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| Online Access: | http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1500310385542543 |
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ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-osu15003103855425432021-08-03T07:03:22Z Legalized Rent-Seeking: How Dictators Use Civil Courts to Manage Corruption Hanson, Margaret C. Legal Studies Political Science authoritarian authoritarian stability courts post-Soviet Kazakhstan rule of law My dissertation confronts a surprising reality: though, as most political economy literature predicts, state ocials in autocracies expropriate private property with im- punity, they often take the seemingly redundant step of turning to courts to resolve resulting conflicts with property owners. Equally puzzling is many citizens’ willing- ness to do the same, despite awareness that courts are dependent, corrupt, and biased in favor of the state. In this context, why would either ocials or citizens choose lit- igation? I find that each does so for distinct yet complementary reasons. Autocrats compel local executive ocials to channel disputes through courts to address negative consequences from those ocials’ predatory behavior, while citizens seize upon the opportunity for marginal improvements vis-a-vis the powerful local executives who targeted them. The executive seeks to control rather than eliminate this activity by ocials, because tacit permission to use their positions for self-enrichment helps ensure subordinates’ loyalty. However, this local-level corruption also generates costs for the autocrat. In particular, it sparks social unrest. Requiring ocials to channel conflict through courts reduces protests and other collective action by victims, oers an improved outcome for a select few of them, and creates and enforces guidelines for ocials’ behavior. In short, formal legal institutions help the autocrat manage corruption; in doing so, they stabilize and sustain the regime. 2017 English text The Ohio State University / OhioLINK http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1500310385542543 http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1500310385542543 unrestricted This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws. |
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NDLTD |
| language |
English |
| sources |
NDLTD |
| topic |
Legal Studies Political Science authoritarian authoritarian stability courts post-Soviet Kazakhstan rule of law |
| spellingShingle |
Legal Studies Political Science authoritarian authoritarian stability courts post-Soviet Kazakhstan rule of law Hanson, Margaret C. Legalized Rent-Seeking: How Dictators Use Civil Courts to Manage Corruption |
| author |
Hanson, Margaret C. |
| author_facet |
Hanson, Margaret C. |
| author_sort |
Hanson, Margaret C. |
| title |
Legalized Rent-Seeking: How Dictators Use Civil Courts to Manage Corruption |
| title_short |
Legalized Rent-Seeking: How Dictators Use Civil Courts to Manage Corruption |
| title_full |
Legalized Rent-Seeking: How Dictators Use Civil Courts to Manage Corruption |
| title_fullStr |
Legalized Rent-Seeking: How Dictators Use Civil Courts to Manage Corruption |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Legalized Rent-Seeking: How Dictators Use Civil Courts to Manage Corruption |
| title_sort |
legalized rent-seeking: how dictators use civil courts to manage corruption |
| publisher |
The Ohio State University / OhioLINK |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| url |
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1500310385542543 |
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AT hansonmargaretc legalizedrentseekinghowdictatorsusecivilcourtstomanagecorruption |
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1719452772573642752 |