Judgment-Rationale Inconsistency In The U.S. Supreme Court

Judgment-Rationale Inconsistency In The U.S. Supreme Court

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hitt, Matthew P.
Language:English
Published: The Ohio State University / OhioLINK 2014
Subjects:
Political Science
Supreme Court
Judicial Politics
Social Choice Theory
Discursive Dilemma
Doctrinal Paradox
Online Access:http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1406124744
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spelling ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-osu14061247442021-08-03T06:26:00Z Judgment-Rationale Inconsistency In The U.S. Supreme Court Hitt, Matthew P. Political Science Supreme Court Judicial Politics Social Choice Theory Discursive Dilemma Doctrinal Paradox States exercise authority over citizens' lives and property through the judicial system. In principle, judicial bodies ought to justify this responsibility by providing consistent rationales for their judgments. Consistency means that the outcome of a dispute is supported by reasoning which itself is supported by a majority of judges on a collegial court. Yet without strong assumptions, collective decision making in collegial courts and other bodies is susceptible to inconsistency. Resolving fundamental questions of life, liberty, and property in an inconsistent manner lacks legitimacy due to the lack of reasons given for the exercise of authority. Further, the fractured reasoning of these decisions means that lower courts bound by precedent to follow an inconsistent decision may struggle to determine which rationale or legal rule to apply and thus decide cases inconsistently themselves, cascading the weakening of legitimacy through the legal system.Despite the gravity of these potential consequences, the severity of the problem of judgment-rationale inconsistency is unknown. To remedy this lack of knowledge, I undertake a systematic study of inconsistency, focusing on the United States Supreme Court. I analyze the properties of inconsistent decisions, explore the impact of inconsistency on the lower federal courts, and investigate the frequency of inconsistency over time. My analysis advances knowledge about the Supreme Court and social choice theory in several ways. First, the investigation of the case-level correlates of inconsistency shows that the strongest form of inconsistency, the discursive dilemma, arises with unsettling frequency in politically salient cases and in exercises of judicial review over Congress. Second, an analysis of Supreme Court precedent showed that discursive dilemmas are followed significantly less than other precedents at the district court level. This finding indicates that inconsistent precedents are of little use to the legal system at large. Finally, the third analysis shows that the frequency of inconsistency at the Supreme Court fell considerably after 1988, when the Court gained virtually total discretion to set its agenda. This finding makes a theoretical contribution by demonstrating that known stability-enhancing institutions for legislative committees, like agenda control, can also improve the consistency of a collegial court's output.Scholars assume inconsistency emerges very rarely. Yet I find that inconsistency makes up between 1 and 13 % of the Court's output in any given term 1946-2010. Further, it appears the Court does not resolve conflicts between lower courts when such resolution would generate an inconsistency. I argue that inconsistency represents an unavoidable pathology for any hierarchical judicial system. Therefore, societies must choose where in their judicial hierarchies inconsistency is least damaging. My research demonstrates that this normative institutional choice is necessitated and motivated by empirical reality. 2014-10-29 English text The Ohio State University / OhioLINK http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1406124744 http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1406124744 unrestricted This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws.
collection NDLTD
language English
sources NDLTD
topic Political Science
Supreme Court
Judicial Politics
Social Choice Theory
Discursive Dilemma
Doctrinal Paradox
spellingShingle Political Science
Supreme Court
Judicial Politics
Social Choice Theory
Discursive Dilemma
Doctrinal Paradox
Hitt, Matthew P.
Judgment-Rationale Inconsistency In The U.S. Supreme Court
author Hitt, Matthew P.
author_facet Hitt, Matthew P.
author_sort Hitt, Matthew P.
title Judgment-Rationale Inconsistency In The U.S. Supreme Court
title_short Judgment-Rationale Inconsistency In The U.S. Supreme Court
title_full Judgment-Rationale Inconsistency In The U.S. Supreme Court
title_fullStr Judgment-Rationale Inconsistency In The U.S. Supreme Court
title_full_unstemmed Judgment-Rationale Inconsistency In The U.S. Supreme Court
title_sort judgment-rationale inconsistency in the u.s. supreme court
publisher The Ohio State University / OhioLINK
publishDate 2014
url http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1406124744
work_keys_str_mv AT hittmatthewp judgmentrationaleinconsistencyintheussupremecourt
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