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ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-osu1273073343
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ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-osu12730733432021-08-03T05:59:14Z Destiny's second hand : the Republic of KoreaArmy, KMAG, and the war, 1945-1953 Gibby, Bryan R. <p>In the earliest days of the Korean War, the Commander in Chief of the United States Far East Command, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur toured the broken battlefront near the Han River, and observed for himself the chaotic state of affairs. Korean troops, outmaneuvered, outgunned, and unsupported, appeared beaten.</p><p>MacArthur's report to Washington was pessimistic: "South Korean casualties as an index to fighting have not shown adequate resistance capabilities or the will to fight and our estimate is that a complete collapse is possible." MacArthur's opinion rested unchallenged, and remains unchallenged to this day.</p><p>This study explores the validity of MacArthur's judgment, particularly in light of the Korean Army's pre-war development and organization. Fundamental to the evaluation of the Korean Army's capability is an analysis of the role played by American military advisors from September 1945 to July 1953. Consequently, there are two purposes to this study, which relies on archival documents and official histories. First, it is to account for the military contribution of the South Korean Army from its earliest days as a Constabulary to a national Army; from its near death experience in the summer of 1950 and its humiliation in 1951; to reformation and triumph in 1952-53.</p><p>Second, this story is about the American officers and men who gave the ROK Army the tactical and technical expertise to develop a modern military organization. From their American counterparts, the Koreans learned and developed competent leadership, military professionalism, and tactical and technical skill in fighting modern war.</p><p>This study concludes that the Korean Army in 1950 lacked a viable institutional foundation to produce tactically competent officers and to train units for war. In the summer of 1951, with the advice of the Americans, the Koreans embarked on an ambitious program of reformation that addressed officer leadership, unit training, and expansion. By the end of the war, the Koreans bore the burden of combat almost exclusively. The armistice could never have been signed without them. Therefore, the story of the Korean War would be vastly different had either organization failed to adapt to the war's demands.</p> 2002 English text The Ohio State University / OhioLINK http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1273073343 http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1273073343 unrestricted This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws.
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NDLTD
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English
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| sources |
NDLTD
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| author |
Gibby, Bryan R.
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| spellingShingle |
Gibby, Bryan R.
Destiny's second hand : the Republic of KoreaArmy, KMAG, and the war, 1945-1953
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| author_facet |
Gibby, Bryan R.
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| author_sort |
Gibby, Bryan R.
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| title |
Destiny's second hand : the Republic of KoreaArmy, KMAG, and the war, 1945-1953
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| title_short |
Destiny's second hand : the Republic of KoreaArmy, KMAG, and the war, 1945-1953
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| title_full |
Destiny's second hand : the Republic of KoreaArmy, KMAG, and the war, 1945-1953
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| title_fullStr |
Destiny's second hand : the Republic of KoreaArmy, KMAG, and the war, 1945-1953
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| title_full_unstemmed |
Destiny's second hand : the Republic of KoreaArmy, KMAG, and the war, 1945-1953
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| title_sort |
destiny's second hand : the republic of koreaarmy, kmag, and the war, 1945-1953
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| publisher |
The Ohio State University / OhioLINK
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| publishDate |
2002
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| url |
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1273073343
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| work_keys_str_mv |
AT gibbybryanr destinyssecondhandtherepublicofkoreaarmykmagandthewar19451953
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| _version_ |
1719428964366155776
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