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ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-osu1173215267
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ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-osu11732152672021-08-03T05:52:04Z Use of mixed signaling strategies in international crisis negotiations Wszolek, Unislawa M. The assertion that clear signaling prevents unnecessary war drives much of the recent developments in research on international crises signaling, so much so that this work has aimed at identifying types of clear signals. But if clear signals are the only mechanism for preventing war, as the signaling literature claims, an important puzzle remains – why are signals that combine both carrot and stick components sent and why are signals that are partial or ambiguous sent. While these signals would seemingly work at cross-purposes undermining the signaler's goals, actually, we observe them frequently in crises that not only end short of war but also that realize the signaler's goals. Through a game theoretic model, this dissertation theorizes that because these alternatives to clear signals increase the attractiveness, and therefore the likelihood, of compliance they are a more cost-effective way to show resolve and avoid unnecessary conflict than clear signals. In addition to building a game theoretic model, an additional contribution of this thesis is to develop a method for observing mixed versus clear signaling strategies and use this method to test the linkage between signaling and crisis outcomes. Results of statistical analyses support theoretical expectations: clear signaling strategies might not always be the most effective way to secure peace, while mixed signaling strategies can be an effective deterrent. Finally the theoretical as well as empirical findings help to address the age-old debate between “hawks” and “doves” – foreign policy, which combines threats and cooperative elements, can be cheaper and more effective than foreign policy which relies on threats alone. 2007-03-08 English text The Ohio State University / OhioLINK http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1173215267 http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1173215267 unrestricted This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws.
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NDLTD
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| language |
English
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| sources |
NDLTD
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| author |
Wszolek, Unislawa M.
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| spellingShingle |
Wszolek, Unislawa M.
Use of mixed signaling strategies in international crisis negotiations
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| author_facet |
Wszolek, Unislawa M.
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| author_sort |
Wszolek, Unislawa M.
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| title |
Use of mixed signaling strategies in international crisis negotiations
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| title_short |
Use of mixed signaling strategies in international crisis negotiations
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| title_full |
Use of mixed signaling strategies in international crisis negotiations
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| title_fullStr |
Use of mixed signaling strategies in international crisis negotiations
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| title_full_unstemmed |
Use of mixed signaling strategies in international crisis negotiations
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| title_sort |
use of mixed signaling strategies in international crisis negotiations
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| publisher |
The Ohio State University / OhioLINK
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| publishDate |
2007
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| url |
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1173215267
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| work_keys_str_mv |
AT wszolekunislawam useofmixedsignalingstrategiesininternationalcrisisnegotiations
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| _version_ |
1719426811330297856
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