A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge
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The Ohio State University / OhioLINK
2006
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| Online Access: | http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1148869371 |
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ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-osu11488693712021-08-03T05:51:03Z A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge Smith, Joshua A. Philosophy epistemology relevant alternatives This project shows that a relevant alternatives account of knowledge is correct. Such accounts maintain that knowing that something is the case requires eliminating all of the relevant alternatives to what is believed. Despite generating a great deal of interest after Dretske and Goldman introduced them, relevant alternatives accounts have been abandoned by many due to the inability of those who defend such analyses to provide general accounts of what it is for an alternative to be relevant, and what it is for an alternative to be eliminated. To make sense of the notion of relevance, a number of relevant alternatives theorists have adopted contextualism, the view that the truth conditions for knowledge attributions shift from one conversational context to the next. The thought that the only way to make sense of relevance is to adopt a controversial thesis about how knowledge attributions work has led others to despair over the prospects for such accounts. I rescue the relevant alternatives approach to knowledge by providing the missing details, and doing so in purely evidentialist terms, thereby avoiding a commitment to contextualism. The account of relevance I develop articulates what it is for a state of affairs (possible world) to be relevant in terms of whether the person is in a good epistemic position in that state of affairs with respect to what the person actually believes. Eliminating a possibility, on my account, is a matter of one's evidence being incompatible with a relevant state of affairs. Since each of these notions is explicated in evidentialist terms (that is, in terms of the evidence one has), I also provide an account of having evidence which is superior to extant accounts. To show that the resulting account of knowledge is correct, I show how the account fares well in the face of problems which plague its competitors. The upshot of the project is that a relevant alternatives analysis is correct, and that endorsing such an account no longer involves concerning oneself with its occult status. 2006-08-08 English text The Ohio State University / OhioLINK http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1148869371 http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1148869371 unrestricted This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws. |
| collection |
NDLTD |
| language |
English |
| sources |
NDLTD |
| topic |
Philosophy epistemology relevant alternatives |
| spellingShingle |
Philosophy epistemology relevant alternatives Smith, Joshua A. A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge |
| author |
Smith, Joshua A. |
| author_facet |
Smith, Joshua A. |
| author_sort |
Smith, Joshua A. |
| title |
A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge |
| title_short |
A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge |
| title_full |
A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge |
| title_fullStr |
A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge |
| title_full_unstemmed |
A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge |
| title_sort |
relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge |
| publisher |
The Ohio State University / OhioLINK |
| publishDate |
2006 |
| url |
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1148869371 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT smithjoshuaa arelevantalternativesanalysisofknowledge AT smithjoshuaa relevantalternativesanalysisofknowledge |
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