Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher's Epistemological Objection
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ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-ohiou15638983367725042021-08-03T07:12:04Z Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher's Epistemological Objection Meyer, Christopher S. Philosophy Divine Command Theory Epistemological Objection This thesis defend John Danaher's version of the Epistemological Objection to Divine Command Theory (DCT). This objection asserts that DCT fails as a metaethical theory of moral obligation due to the fact that there is a group of persons, reasonable nonbelievers, who have knowledge of moral obligations while lacking the knowledge of divine commands required in DCT. The first part of this thesis focuses on this objection and explains how it applies to DCT.An underlying assumption of Danaher's defense is the existence of reasonable nonbelievers, persons who do not violate epistemic duties in their nonbelief. The latter portion of this thesis defends the existence of such persons by considering and responding to the challenge that all nonbelievers violate at least one epistemic duty since their nonbelief is the product of the culture in which they are immersed, as opposed to rationally informed inquiry. In response to this challenge, it is shown that the existence of reasonable nonbelievers is the default position and that the burden of proof is on those claiming all nonbelief is unreasonable. It is also noted that the high number and wide range of cases that qualify for nonbelief render the prospect of showing that all nonbelief is unreasonable rather bleak. Having shown that the cultural bias challenge is left wanting and that we should accept the existence of reasonable nonbelievers, the thesis concludes the epistemological objection stands as a serious challenge to divine command theory. 2019-09-23 English text Ohio University / OhioLINK http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1563898336772504 http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1563898336772504 unrestricted This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws. |
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NDLTD |
language |
English |
sources |
NDLTD |
topic |
Philosophy Divine Command Theory Epistemological Objection |
spellingShingle |
Philosophy Divine Command Theory Epistemological Objection Meyer, Christopher S. Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher's Epistemological Objection |
author |
Meyer, Christopher S. |
author_facet |
Meyer, Christopher S. |
author_sort |
Meyer, Christopher S. |
title |
Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher's Epistemological Objection |
title_short |
Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher's Epistemological Objection |
title_full |
Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher's Epistemological Objection |
title_fullStr |
Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher's Epistemological Objection |
title_full_unstemmed |
Divine Command Theory: Defending Danaher's Epistemological Objection |
title_sort |
divine command theory: defending danaher's epistemological objection |
publisher |
Ohio University / OhioLINK |
publishDate |
2019 |
url |
http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1563898336772504 |
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AT meyerchristophers divinecommandtheorydefendingdanahersepistemologicalobjection |
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