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spelling ndltd-OhioLink-oai-etd.ohiolink.edu-bgsu14277984812021-08-03T06:29:33Z Resentment and Morality Weber, Elijah Philosophy Ethics resentment morality moral philosophy moral emotions neo-sentimentalism immoral emotions imprudent emotions fittingness cognitivist theories of emotion non-cognitivist theories of emotion hybrid theories of emotion Resentment is widely held to be central in moral practice and moral theory, perhaps even the key to understanding concepts like moral wrongness and moral responsibility. Despite this, philosophers pay relatively little attention to resentment itself. For the most part, it is often simply assumed that resentment is a kind of anger, where resentment is differentiated from anger by a belief, judgment, or thought that one has been morally wronged by the object of one’s emotional response. However, this assumption gives rise to problematically circular accounts of our moral concepts, since it involves characterizing resentment in terms of the very concepts that moral philosophers were hoping to explain in terms of resentment. And while some philosophers have claimed that the circularity inherent in such accounts is unproblematic, I contend that such accounts are not informative enough to help us understand our moral concepts. My dissertation explores the implications of the assumption that resentment is simply a moral form of anger, and argues that this account of resentment is both inaccurate and not well-suited to the role that resentment plays in moral philosophy. First, I argue that despite prevailing assumptions to the contrary, resentment should not be thought of simply as a moral version of anger. Instead, I argue for a non-cognitive, adaptive account of resentment as an emotional response to violations of the interpersonal norms of one’s social group. This account is both empirically well-grounded and consistent with evolutionary and developmental accounts of emotion. It also avoids the circularity inherent in contemporary characterizations of our moral concepts, when given in terms of resentment. Finally, it allows for a ready-made response to the charge that resentment is an immoral or imprudent emotion that we would be better off without. Resentment, on this account, is an adaptive response with deep biological roots, and it plays a crucial role in the success of human cooperative endeavors. 2015-04-08 English text Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1427798481 http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1427798481 unrestricted This thesis or dissertation is protected by copyright: all rights reserved. It may not be copied or redistributed beyond the terms of applicable copyright laws.
collection NDLTD
language English
sources NDLTD
topic Philosophy
Ethics
resentment
morality
moral philosophy
moral emotions
neo-sentimentalism
immoral emotions
imprudent emotions
fittingness
cognitivist theories of emotion
non-cognitivist theories of emotion
hybrid theories of emotion
spellingShingle Philosophy
Ethics
resentment
morality
moral philosophy
moral emotions
neo-sentimentalism
immoral emotions
imprudent emotions
fittingness
cognitivist theories of emotion
non-cognitivist theories of emotion
hybrid theories of emotion
Weber, Elijah
Resentment and Morality
author Weber, Elijah
author_facet Weber, Elijah
author_sort Weber, Elijah
title Resentment and Morality
title_short Resentment and Morality
title_full Resentment and Morality
title_fullStr Resentment and Morality
title_full_unstemmed Resentment and Morality
title_sort resentment and morality
publisher Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK
publishDate 2015
url http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1427798481
work_keys_str_mv AT weberelijah resentmentandmorality
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