Game theory and mechanism design for cooperative competition dilemmas between healthcare providers
Cooperation among healthcare providers should be encouraged to achieve the public health benefits of efficient coordination, yet natural competition in healthcare markets often creates incentive to choose strategies that favor the individual provider. This conflict can interfere with the ideal of co...
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/2047/D20211212 |
Summary: | Cooperation among healthcare providers should be encouraged to achieve the public health benefits of efficient coordination, yet natural competition in healthcare markets often creates incentive to choose strategies that favor the individual provider. This conflict can interfere with the ideal of coordinated care when less efficient solutions add to rising healthcare costs. National health spending reached $2.8 trillion in 2012 and is expected to exceed 20% of the United
States gross domestic product by 2022, while an estimated one third of healthcare spending is waste including $190 billion due to overtreatment and $160 billion due to failures of care delivery and care coordination. |
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