| Summary: | Transitioning from Operation Iraqi Freedom I to Operation Iraqi Freedom II, the United States' strategy of "the Surge" faced great challenges and achieved no clear result after its implementation. The Surge brought additional military equipment to Iraq and maximized U.S. forces' capabilities by deploying an additional 30,000 troops in February 2007. The policy implications are stark when examining the evolution of violence in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003.
The initial years of the invasion created an insurgency, as well as the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives. By 2005, Iraq's sectarian cleavages increased within the population, splintering society into a civil war. Threatening policy failure, the U.S. government introduced unconventional war tactics coupled with conventional war tactics, the all-encompassing component: the Surge. The focus of the Surge, which provided increased troop levels to Iraq's most populated cities as well as
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, would prove to be an effective strategy to stabilize Iraqi society and drive out Al-Qaeda operatives.
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