Market reaction to executive compensation disclosure: evidence from the Security and Exchange Commission's 1992 disclosure initiatives

Market reaction to executive compensation disclosure: evidence from the Security and Exchange Commission's 1992 disclosure initiatives

The SEC's disclosure initiatives passed in 1992 required increased levels of executive compensation disclosure accompanied by new formats for disclosure. I examine the market response to this new regulation at the firm level. I also test for external information spillovers. I find no evidence t...

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Main Author: Sullivan, Jared James Crofts
Language:en
Published: 2008
Online Access:http://etd.lib.montana.edu/etd/2008/sullivan/SullivanJ0508.pdf
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spelling ndltd-MONTSTATE-http---etd.lib.montana.edu-etd-2008-sullivan-SullivanJ0508.pdf2012-03-09T15:49:05Z Market reaction to executive compensation disclosure: evidence from the Security and Exchange Commission's 1992 disclosure initiatives Sullivan, Jared James Crofts The SEC's disclosure initiatives passed in 1992 required increased levels of executive compensation disclosure accompanied by new formats for disclosure. I examine the market response to this new regulation at the firm level. I also test for external information spillovers. I find no evidence that the market systematically values the additional information provided by the new proxy format. I also find no evidence of new information spillovers being created by the new disclosure mandates; lending no support for proscriptive regulations. 2008-05-15 Thesis Montana State University en http://etd.lib.montana.edu/etd/2008/sullivan/SullivanJ0508.pdf
collection NDLTD
language en
sources NDLTD
description The SEC's disclosure initiatives passed in 1992 required increased levels of executive compensation disclosure accompanied by new formats for disclosure. I examine the market response to this new regulation at the firm level. I also test for external information spillovers. I find no evidence that the market systematically values the additional information provided by the new proxy format. I also find no evidence of new information spillovers being created by the new disclosure mandates; lending no support for proscriptive regulations.
author Sullivan, Jared James Crofts
spellingShingle Sullivan, Jared James Crofts
Market reaction to executive compensation disclosure: evidence from the Security and Exchange Commission's 1992 disclosure initiatives
author_facet Sullivan, Jared James Crofts
author_sort Sullivan, Jared James Crofts
title Market reaction to executive compensation disclosure: evidence from the Security and Exchange Commission's 1992 disclosure initiatives
title_short Market reaction to executive compensation disclosure: evidence from the Security and Exchange Commission's 1992 disclosure initiatives
title_full Market reaction to executive compensation disclosure: evidence from the Security and Exchange Commission's 1992 disclosure initiatives
title_fullStr Market reaction to executive compensation disclosure: evidence from the Security and Exchange Commission's 1992 disclosure initiatives
title_full_unstemmed Market reaction to executive compensation disclosure: evidence from the Security and Exchange Commission's 1992 disclosure initiatives
title_sort market reaction to executive compensation disclosure: evidence from the security and exchange commission's 1992 disclosure initiatives
publishDate 2008
url http://etd.lib.montana.edu/etd/2008/sullivan/SullivanJ0508.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT sullivanjaredjamescrofts marketreactiontoexecutivecompensationdisclosureevidencefromthesecurityandexchangecommissions1992disclosureinitiatives
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