Dynamic traffic congestion pricing mechanism with user-centric considerations

Thesis: S.M. in Transportation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 2013. === Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. === Includes bibliographical references (pages 85-95). === In this thesis, we consider the problem of designing real-time traffic...

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Main Author: Bui, Kim Thien
Other Authors: Emilio Frazzoli.
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2014
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/85817
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spelling ndltd-MIT-oai-dspace.mit.edu-1721.1-858172019-05-02T16:13:31Z Dynamic traffic congestion pricing mechanism with user-centric considerations Bui, Kim Thien Emilio Frazzoli. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering. Civil and Environmental Engineering. Thesis: S.M. in Transportation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 2013. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (pages 85-95). In this thesis, we consider the problem of designing real-time traffic routing systems in urban areas. Optimal dynamic routing for multiple passengers is known to be computationally hard due to its combinatorial nature. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a novel mechanism called User-Centric Dynamic Pricing (UCDP) based on recent advances in algorithmic mechanism design. The mechanism allows for congestion-free traffic in general road networks with heterogeneous users, while satisfying each user's travel preference. The mechanism first informs whether a passenger should use public transportation or the road network. In the latter case, a passenger reports his maximum accepted travel time with a lower bound announced publicly by the road authority. The mechanism then assigns the passenger a path that matches with his preference given the current traffic condition in the network. The proposed mechanism introduces a fairness constrained shortest path (FCSP) problem with a special structure, thus enabling polynomial time computation of path allocation that maximizes the sequential social surplus and guarantees fairness among passengers. The tolls of paths are then computed according to marginal cost payments. We show that reporting true preference is a weakly dominant strategy. The performance of the proposed mechanism is demonstrated on several simulated routing experiments in comparison to user equilibrium and system optimum. by Kim Thien Bui. S.M. in Transportation 2014-03-19T15:47:24Z 2014-03-19T15:47:24Z 2013 2013 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/85817 872133938 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 95 pages application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Civil and Environmental Engineering.
spellingShingle Civil and Environmental Engineering.
Bui, Kim Thien
Dynamic traffic congestion pricing mechanism with user-centric considerations
description Thesis: S.M. in Transportation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 2013. === Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. === Includes bibliographical references (pages 85-95). === In this thesis, we consider the problem of designing real-time traffic routing systems in urban areas. Optimal dynamic routing for multiple passengers is known to be computationally hard due to its combinatorial nature. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a novel mechanism called User-Centric Dynamic Pricing (UCDP) based on recent advances in algorithmic mechanism design. The mechanism allows for congestion-free traffic in general road networks with heterogeneous users, while satisfying each user's travel preference. The mechanism first informs whether a passenger should use public transportation or the road network. In the latter case, a passenger reports his maximum accepted travel time with a lower bound announced publicly by the road authority. The mechanism then assigns the passenger a path that matches with his preference given the current traffic condition in the network. The proposed mechanism introduces a fairness constrained shortest path (FCSP) problem with a special structure, thus enabling polynomial time computation of path allocation that maximizes the sequential social surplus and guarantees fairness among passengers. The tolls of paths are then computed according to marginal cost payments. We show that reporting true preference is a weakly dominant strategy. The performance of the proposed mechanism is demonstrated on several simulated routing experiments in comparison to user equilibrium and system optimum. === by Kim Thien Bui. === S.M. in Transportation
author2 Emilio Frazzoli.
author_facet Emilio Frazzoli.
Bui, Kim Thien
author Bui, Kim Thien
author_sort Bui, Kim Thien
title Dynamic traffic congestion pricing mechanism with user-centric considerations
title_short Dynamic traffic congestion pricing mechanism with user-centric considerations
title_full Dynamic traffic congestion pricing mechanism with user-centric considerations
title_fullStr Dynamic traffic congestion pricing mechanism with user-centric considerations
title_full_unstemmed Dynamic traffic congestion pricing mechanism with user-centric considerations
title_sort dynamic traffic congestion pricing mechanism with user-centric considerations
publisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology
publishDate 2014
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/85817
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