Bombs unbuilt : power, ideas and institutions in international politics

• Main Author: Walsh, James Joseph, 1959-
• Other Authors: George W. Rathjens.
• Format: Others
• Language: English
• Published: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2009
• Subjects: Political Science.
• Online Access: http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/8237; http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8237

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2001. === Includes bibliographical references. === Nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons in human history, but contrary to virtually every prediction by scholars, relatively few states have acquired them. Why are there so few nuclear weapons states? What factors lead governments to reject and even renounce the ultimate weapon? What do the disconfirmed predictions of widespread proliferation tell us about contemporary theories of international relations? To answer these questions, this study tests 15 hypotheses based on core categories in international politics: power, resources, ideas, and institutions. The hypotheses on power suggest that a state's nuclear decisions are a function of its external threats and its place in the international system. They claim that the slow pace of proliferation can be explained by several factors: a lack of threat, bipolarity, security guarantees, and superpower pressure. The resource hypotheses emphasize material capability, i.e., whether a state has the money, scientific talent, or access to foreign technology required to develop nuclear weapons. Hypotheses on the role of ideas often focus on the beliefs held by decision makers. This study tests the influence of anti-nuclear norms on proliferation decision making. Institutional explanations highlight either domestic institutional arrangements (whether a state is democratic, whether it is liberalizing economically, its organizational politics) or international institutions like the nonproliferation regime. Many of the tests employ a data set consisting of 132 nuclear decisions and outcomes. === (cont.) The data set is based on archival and interview material that documents nuclear decision making in two countries: Australia and Egypt. The test results suggest that the dominant explanations for nuclear decision making -- explanations based on power, resources, and norms -- fail to account for outcomes. By contrast, institutional explanations, especially those involving organizational politics and regimes, generate robust results. The findings have direct implications for broader theories of international relations, and in particular, for variants of Realism, where a number of scholars have used proliferation decisions as an explicit test of their theory. Overall, the findings point to the enduring and decisive importance of politics and institutions, even in circumstances where fundamental questions of security and national survival are at stake. === by James Joseph Walsh. === Ph.D.