Self-identification and self-knowledge

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2010. === "September 2010." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. === Includes bibliographical references (p. 119-122). === The traditional view has it that self-locating beliefs are distinctive in...

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Main Author: Kwon, Hongwoo
Other Authors: Robert C. Stalnaker.
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2011
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62418
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spelling ndltd-MIT-oai-dspace.mit.edu-1721.1-624182019-05-02T15:41:51Z Self-identification and self-knowledge Kwon, Hongwoo Robert C. Stalnaker. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy. Linguistics and Philosophy. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2010. "September 2010." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (p. 119-122). The traditional view has it that self-locating beliefs are distinctive in that they have distinctive contents. Against this, I claim that the distinctive element of self-locating beliefs should be placed outside contents. If someone believes that he himself is hungry, he not only has a propositional belief of a certain particular person that he is hungry, but also identifies himself as that particular person. The latter is not a matter of propositional belief, but a matter of taking a first personal perspective on that person's actions, beliefs and experiences. A subject takes his actions and beliefs to be "up to" himself, and regards his experiences as giving information about where he is located in the world. All these phenomena are shown to be related to the peculiar ways in which we come to know certain facts about ourselves. So self-identification is conceptually connected to self-knowledge. The three chapters discuss some parts or aspects of this reasoning. Chapter 1, "Perry's Problem and Moore's Paradox," claims that Perry's problem of the essential indexical and Moore's paradox are essentially a single problem applied to two different aspects of our rational activities, actions and beliefs, respectively. Chapter 2, "On What the Two Gods Might Not Know," defends what may be called an ability hypothesis about self-locating knowledge, drawing on David Lewis's ability hypothesis about phenomenal knowledge. What the gods might lack is best viewed as the abilities of self-knowledge. Chapter 3, "What Is the First Person Perspective?" asks what it is to take a first person perspective and view oneself as the author of one's own actions. It is a matter of taking a deliberative stance toward one's own actions, which in turn can be best understood as the special ways in which we know them. by Hongwoo Kwon. Ph.D. 2011-04-25T15:55:39Z 2011-04-25T15:55:39Z 2010 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62418 710986233 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 122 p. application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Linguistics and Philosophy.
spellingShingle Linguistics and Philosophy.
Kwon, Hongwoo
Self-identification and self-knowledge
description Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2010. === "September 2010." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. === Includes bibliographical references (p. 119-122). === The traditional view has it that self-locating beliefs are distinctive in that they have distinctive contents. Against this, I claim that the distinctive element of self-locating beliefs should be placed outside contents. If someone believes that he himself is hungry, he not only has a propositional belief of a certain particular person that he is hungry, but also identifies himself as that particular person. The latter is not a matter of propositional belief, but a matter of taking a first personal perspective on that person's actions, beliefs and experiences. A subject takes his actions and beliefs to be "up to" himself, and regards his experiences as giving information about where he is located in the world. All these phenomena are shown to be related to the peculiar ways in which we come to know certain facts about ourselves. So self-identification is conceptually connected to self-knowledge. The three chapters discuss some parts or aspects of this reasoning. Chapter 1, "Perry's Problem and Moore's Paradox," claims that Perry's problem of the essential indexical and Moore's paradox are essentially a single problem applied to two different aspects of our rational activities, actions and beliefs, respectively. Chapter 2, "On What the Two Gods Might Not Know," defends what may be called an ability hypothesis about self-locating knowledge, drawing on David Lewis's ability hypothesis about phenomenal knowledge. What the gods might lack is best viewed as the abilities of self-knowledge. Chapter 3, "What Is the First Person Perspective?" asks what it is to take a first person perspective and view oneself as the author of one's own actions. It is a matter of taking a deliberative stance toward one's own actions, which in turn can be best understood as the special ways in which we know them. === by Hongwoo Kwon. === Ph.D.
author2 Robert C. Stalnaker.
author_facet Robert C. Stalnaker.
Kwon, Hongwoo
author Kwon, Hongwoo
author_sort Kwon, Hongwoo
title Self-identification and self-knowledge
title_short Self-identification and self-knowledge
title_full Self-identification and self-knowledge
title_fullStr Self-identification and self-knowledge
title_full_unstemmed Self-identification and self-knowledge
title_sort self-identification and self-knowledge
publisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology
publishDate 2011
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62418
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