Using STAMP to understand recent increases in malicious software activity

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, Technology and Policy Program, 2005. === Includes bibliographical references. === My advisor, Professor Leveson has developed an accident modeling framework called STAMP (Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling and Proce...

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Main Author: Zipkin, David S
Other Authors: Nancy G. Leveson.
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2006
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/32285
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spelling ndltd-MIT-oai-dspace.mit.edu-1721.1-322852019-05-02T15:36:33Z Using STAMP to understand recent increases in malicious software activity Using Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes to understand recent increases in malicious software activity Zipkin, David S Nancy G. Leveson. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Technology and Policy Program. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Technology and Policy Program. Technology and Policy Program. Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, Technology and Policy Program, 2005. Includes bibliographical references. My advisor, Professor Leveson has developed an accident modeling framework called STAMP (Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes.) Traditional accident models typically focus on component failure; in contrast, STAMP includes interactions between components as well as social, economic, and legal factors. My research extends Leveson's STAMP accident model and applies it to a security problem. I have chosen to investigate the threat posed by malicious computer software such as computer viruses. The problem is especially interesting because surrounding the technical aspects of malicious software is a rich socio-technical system. The first part of the thesis investigates two recent computer worm outbreaks and identifies the numerous ways in which the security system failed. For both outbreaks, there were multiple points of failure including the existence of un-patched workstations, software organizations that distributed insecure software, the lack of sufficient legal disincentives to dissuade hackers, as well as many others. The thesis goes on to examine why the system was operating in such an insecure manner. As is generally the case when modeling an accident, the explanation goes beyond any single factor. I argue that that lack of Internet security can be largely attributed to the fact that those providing critical parts of Internet security do not have sufficient incentives to make good security decisions; instead they often make decisions at odds with Internet security. The thesis concludes with a discussion of policy and technical recommendations for addressing computer security. by David S. Zipkin. S.M. 2006-03-29T18:30:43Z 2006-03-29T18:30:43Z 2005 2005 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/32285 61325851 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 117 p. 6186103 bytes 6193215 bytes application/pdf application/pdf application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology
collection NDLTD
language English
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic Technology and Policy Program.
spellingShingle Technology and Policy Program.
Zipkin, David S
Using STAMP to understand recent increases in malicious software activity
description Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, Technology and Policy Program, 2005. === Includes bibliographical references. === My advisor, Professor Leveson has developed an accident modeling framework called STAMP (Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes.) Traditional accident models typically focus on component failure; in contrast, STAMP includes interactions between components as well as social, economic, and legal factors. My research extends Leveson's STAMP accident model and applies it to a security problem. I have chosen to investigate the threat posed by malicious computer software such as computer viruses. The problem is especially interesting because surrounding the technical aspects of malicious software is a rich socio-technical system. The first part of the thesis investigates two recent computer worm outbreaks and identifies the numerous ways in which the security system failed. For both outbreaks, there were multiple points of failure including the existence of un-patched workstations, software organizations that distributed insecure software, the lack of sufficient legal disincentives to dissuade hackers, as well as many others. The thesis goes on to examine why the system was operating in such an insecure manner. As is generally the case when modeling an accident, the explanation goes beyond any single factor. I argue that that lack of Internet security can be largely attributed to the fact that those providing critical parts of Internet security do not have sufficient incentives to make good security decisions; instead they often make decisions at odds with Internet security. The thesis concludes with a discussion of policy and technical recommendations for addressing computer security. === by David S. Zipkin. === S.M.
author2 Nancy G. Leveson.
author_facet Nancy G. Leveson.
Zipkin, David S
author Zipkin, David S
author_sort Zipkin, David S
title Using STAMP to understand recent increases in malicious software activity
title_short Using STAMP to understand recent increases in malicious software activity
title_full Using STAMP to understand recent increases in malicious software activity
title_fullStr Using STAMP to understand recent increases in malicious software activity
title_full_unstemmed Using STAMP to understand recent increases in malicious software activity
title_sort using stamp to understand recent increases in malicious software activity
publisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology
publishDate 2006
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/32285
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