Nuclear warhead monitoring : a study of photon emissions from fission neutron interactions with high explosives as a tool in arms control verification

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, 2017. === This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections. === Cataloged from student-submitted PDF...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Snowden, Mareena Robinson
Other Authors: Richard C. Lanza and Adam Bernstein.
Format: Others
Language:English
Published: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113723
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language English
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topic Nuclear Science and Engineering.
spellingShingle Nuclear Science and Engineering.
Snowden, Mareena Robinson
Nuclear warhead monitoring : a study of photon emissions from fission neutron interactions with high explosives as a tool in arms control verification
description Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, 2017. === This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections. === Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis. === Includes bibliographical references. === Since the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the technical community has been working to develop verification options that provide confidence in the reduction or elimination of nuclear warheads, while respecting countries' requirement of limited access to national secrets. This dissertation used a simplified open-source warhead model as a vehicle to investigate the use of secondary gammas, generated passively by neutron interactions inside high explosive (HE), as a signature for the presence of a warhead-like object. Analytical calculations were done to estimate the detectability of radiative capture and inelastic scatter emissions generated within the warhead model. Results showed the emission of gammas from nitrogen, between 5-7 MeV, to be detectable above background with dwell-times exceeding 90 minutes. These calculations motivated the systematic study of the signal experimentally using surrogate materials to represent the warhead's weapons-grade plutonium and HE. The experiment did not show the expected signals. This motivated a simulation of the mock-up experiment using the radiation transport code MCNP6 to help understand the observed results. The experimental and simulation data suggest that correlated backgrounds from neutron interactions with environmental materials dominate the signal. This finding helped provide a basis for understanding the feasibility and challenges to detecting this neutron-induced gamma signal. Three sets of pulse-height spectra have been analyzed: experimental spectra that looked at the effect of the HE surrogate on the overall detected counts; simulated spectra that helped to understand the underlying contributors to the observed experimental result; and a data-MCNP6 comparison that assessed the accuracy of the simulated results. Each set contributed to the quantification of detectability for the emissions of interest. The findings suggest the passive detection of the expected high-energy gamma signal is not feasible, unless backgrounds can be better controlled. The difficulty is attributed to low solid-angle coverage of the neutron source by the melamine explosive surrogate, and competing backgrounds produced by neutron-source interactions with surrounding materials. This thesis also examined the benefits and tradeoffs of this particular verification approach by investigating the non-technical context of the verification, such as the preferences of negotiators. The tradeoffs between confidence and intrusiveness highlight the need for technical verification solutions that span the diversity of options. Factors limiting the development of warhead verification systems, from the bias of researchers to issues of classification and sensitive geometries, were discussed. === by Mareena Robinson Snowden. === Ph. D.
author2 Richard C. Lanza and Adam Bernstein.
author_facet Richard C. Lanza and Adam Bernstein.
Snowden, Mareena Robinson
author Snowden, Mareena Robinson
author_sort Snowden, Mareena Robinson
title Nuclear warhead monitoring : a study of photon emissions from fission neutron interactions with high explosives as a tool in arms control verification
title_short Nuclear warhead monitoring : a study of photon emissions from fission neutron interactions with high explosives as a tool in arms control verification
title_full Nuclear warhead monitoring : a study of photon emissions from fission neutron interactions with high explosives as a tool in arms control verification
title_fullStr Nuclear warhead monitoring : a study of photon emissions from fission neutron interactions with high explosives as a tool in arms control verification
title_full_unstemmed Nuclear warhead monitoring : a study of photon emissions from fission neutron interactions with high explosives as a tool in arms control verification
title_sort nuclear warhead monitoring : a study of photon emissions from fission neutron interactions with high explosives as a tool in arms control verification
publisher Massachusetts Institute of Technology
publishDate 2018
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113723
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spelling ndltd-MIT-oai-dspace.mit.edu-1721.1-1137232019-05-02T16:00:40Z Nuclear warhead monitoring : a study of photon emissions from fission neutron interactions with high explosives as a tool in arms control verification Study of photon emissions from fission neutron interactions with high explosives as a tool in arms control verification Snowden, Mareena Robinson Richard C. Lanza and Adam Bernstein. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering. Nuclear Science and Engineering. Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering, 2017. This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections. Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references. Since the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the technical community has been working to develop verification options that provide confidence in the reduction or elimination of nuclear warheads, while respecting countries' requirement of limited access to national secrets. This dissertation used a simplified open-source warhead model as a vehicle to investigate the use of secondary gammas, generated passively by neutron interactions inside high explosive (HE), as a signature for the presence of a warhead-like object. Analytical calculations were done to estimate the detectability of radiative capture and inelastic scatter emissions generated within the warhead model. Results showed the emission of gammas from nitrogen, between 5-7 MeV, to be detectable above background with dwell-times exceeding 90 minutes. These calculations motivated the systematic study of the signal experimentally using surrogate materials to represent the warhead's weapons-grade plutonium and HE. The experiment did not show the expected signals. This motivated a simulation of the mock-up experiment using the radiation transport code MCNP6 to help understand the observed results. The experimental and simulation data suggest that correlated backgrounds from neutron interactions with environmental materials dominate the signal. This finding helped provide a basis for understanding the feasibility and challenges to detecting this neutron-induced gamma signal. Three sets of pulse-height spectra have been analyzed: experimental spectra that looked at the effect of the HE surrogate on the overall detected counts; simulated spectra that helped to understand the underlying contributors to the observed experimental result; and a data-MCNP6 comparison that assessed the accuracy of the simulated results. Each set contributed to the quantification of detectability for the emissions of interest. The findings suggest the passive detection of the expected high-energy gamma signal is not feasible, unless backgrounds can be better controlled. The difficulty is attributed to low solid-angle coverage of the neutron source by the melamine explosive surrogate, and competing backgrounds produced by neutron-source interactions with surrounding materials. This thesis also examined the benefits and tradeoffs of this particular verification approach by investigating the non-technical context of the verification, such as the preferences of negotiators. The tradeoffs between confidence and intrusiveness highlight the need for technical verification solutions that span the diversity of options. Factors limiting the development of warhead verification systems, from the bias of researchers to issues of classification and sensitive geometries, were discussed. by Mareena Robinson Snowden. Ph. D. 2018-02-16T19:27:11Z 2018-02-16T19:27:11Z 2017 2017 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113723 1021853056 eng MIT theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed, downloaded, or printed from this source but further reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 87 pages application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology