Misguided by Experience: A Defense of Custer's Actions at the Little Bighorn

At midday on June 25, 1876, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer split his Seventh Cavalry Regiment into three elements and attacked an enormous village of hostile Indians situated along the Little Bighorn River in modern-day Montana. Custer and his immediate command of five troops, a total of...

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Main Author: Baker, Harold Douglas
Other Authors: William A. Clark
Format: Others
Language:en
Published: LSU 2002
Subjects:
Online Access:http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-0417102-170705/
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spelling ndltd-LSU-oai-etd.lsu.edu-etd-0417102-1707052013-01-07T22:47:54Z Misguided by Experience: A Defense of Custer's Actions at the Little Bighorn Baker, Harold Douglas History At midday on June 25, 1876, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer split his Seventh Cavalry Regiment into three elements and attacked an enormous village of hostile Indians situated along the Little Bighorn River in modern-day Montana. Custer and his immediate command of five troops, a total of 225 men, did not survive the fight. Immediately following the battle, officers-Reno, Benteen, Brisbin, Terry, Gibbon-began to recreate the history of the campaign's recent events in an effort to explain the disaster and clear themselves of responsibility. Their self-serving omission of facts and their convenient "remembrance" of things that had not happened fully blamed Custer for the calamity and heavily influenced future historical assessments of the battle. Numerous explanations for the disaster have surfaced over the years. Driven by vain personal motives, Custer allegedly disobeyed General Terry's orders by taking a direct route to the Indian village and then rushing his exhausted men into battle without waiting for Gibbon's support. He did not conduct a thorough reconnaissance and ignored the warnings of his scouts. He violated a basic maxim of war by splitting his force in the face of the enemy, and his midday attack destroyed any hopes for surprise. Finally, Custer's actions displayed an overall ineptness at fighting Indians. Some of the assessments hold truths, but they must be placed in the context of what Custer knew at the time and expected to encounter. In fact, given his prior experiences and information at hand, Custer correctly configured his forces and acted appropriately by attacking the hostile village. His forces, however, were not enough to overcome the combination of peculiar circumstances, some of his own creation, that opposed them. William A. Clark Karl A. Roider Stanley E. Hilton LSU 2002-04-18 text application/pdf http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-0417102-170705/ http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-0417102-170705/ en unrestricted I hereby grant to LSU or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University Libraries in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all proprietary rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.
collection NDLTD
language en
format Others
sources NDLTD
topic History
spellingShingle History
Baker, Harold Douglas
Misguided by Experience: A Defense of Custer's Actions at the Little Bighorn
description At midday on June 25, 1876, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer split his Seventh Cavalry Regiment into three elements and attacked an enormous village of hostile Indians situated along the Little Bighorn River in modern-day Montana. Custer and his immediate command of five troops, a total of 225 men, did not survive the fight. Immediately following the battle, officers-Reno, Benteen, Brisbin, Terry, Gibbon-began to recreate the history of the campaign's recent events in an effort to explain the disaster and clear themselves of responsibility. Their self-serving omission of facts and their convenient "remembrance" of things that had not happened fully blamed Custer for the calamity and heavily influenced future historical assessments of the battle. Numerous explanations for the disaster have surfaced over the years. Driven by vain personal motives, Custer allegedly disobeyed General Terry's orders by taking a direct route to the Indian village and then rushing his exhausted men into battle without waiting for Gibbon's support. He did not conduct a thorough reconnaissance and ignored the warnings of his scouts. He violated a basic maxim of war by splitting his force in the face of the enemy, and his midday attack destroyed any hopes for surprise. Finally, Custer's actions displayed an overall ineptness at fighting Indians. Some of the assessments hold truths, but they must be placed in the context of what Custer knew at the time and expected to encounter. In fact, given his prior experiences and information at hand, Custer correctly configured his forces and acted appropriately by attacking the hostile village. His forces, however, were not enough to overcome the combination of peculiar circumstances, some of his own creation, that opposed them.
author2 William A. Clark
author_facet William A. Clark
Baker, Harold Douglas
author Baker, Harold Douglas
author_sort Baker, Harold Douglas
title Misguided by Experience: A Defense of Custer's Actions at the Little Bighorn
title_short Misguided by Experience: A Defense of Custer's Actions at the Little Bighorn
title_full Misguided by Experience: A Defense of Custer's Actions at the Little Bighorn
title_fullStr Misguided by Experience: A Defense of Custer's Actions at the Little Bighorn
title_full_unstemmed Misguided by Experience: A Defense of Custer's Actions at the Little Bighorn
title_sort misguided by experience: a defense of custer's actions at the little bighorn
publisher LSU
publishDate 2002
url http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-0417102-170705/
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