| Summary: | In large part for fear that it will foster and maintain manufacturers' or retailers' cartels, resale price maintenance is strictly forbidden in a number of countries. Moreover economic theory has allowed for a better understanding of the motivations and outcomes of this practice and has made possible a revision of the strict prohibition. === This thesis first outlines the theories explaining the use of resale price maintenance. What emerges from these theories is that resale price maintenance is far from being an unequivocably deleterious form of conduct. Indeed, a manufacturer may seek to reach some results that are pro-competitive. Having outlined the arguments for and against the practice, an approach is proposed for detecting resale price maintenance that is likely to damage the consumers' interest. In fact, the problem arises only in cases of cartellization, or abuse of market power. === The second part of the thesis is devoted to an analysis of four legislative regimes: those of the United States of America, Canada, Switzerland and the European Community. Three of these regimes include a strong prohibition against resale price maintenance, whereas the fourth, the Swiss cartel law, treats the practice as per se legal. Despite the diverging legal status reserved to this practice, the comparative law study will demonstrate first the consistency of an economic approach to each situation, and the weakness of the legal reasoning within this area. The analysis of these regimes serves to affirm the conclusions, that resale price maintenance constitutes a real danger only in the case where there is a cartel or abuse of market power. Since these cartel or abuse of market power abuse are themselves usually prohibited, the additional prohibition against resale price maintenance is redundant, and prevents some manufacturers from achieving possible pro-competitive results.
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