Attributions of inferential error, epistemic virtues, and models of minimal rationality
I defend an account of agency which holds that a more desirable, empirically accurate, model of rationality must reject certain well-entrenched assumptions about the connection between logic and good reasoning. I argue following Cherniak, that models of rationality must use desire fulfillment, and n...
Main Author: | Allen-Hermanson, Sean |
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Format: | Others |
Published: |
1996
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Online Access: | http://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/145/1/MQ54364.pdf Allen-Hermanson, Sean <http://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/view/creators/Allen-Hermanson=3ASean=3A=3A.html> (1996) Attributions of inferential error, epistemic virtues, and models of minimal rationality. Masters thesis, Concordia University. |
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