Reference and Reinterpretation

Reference is the relation held to obtain between an expression and what a speaker or thinker intends the expression to represent. Reference is a component of interpretation, the process of giving terms, sentences, and thoughts semantic content. An example of reference in a formal context involves...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kulic, Anthony
Language:en
Published: 2007
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10012/3397
id ndltd-LACETR-oai-collectionscanada.gc.ca-OWTU.10012-3397
record_format oai_dc
spelling ndltd-LACETR-oai-collectionscanada.gc.ca-OWTU.10012-33972013-10-04T04:08:13ZKulic, Anthony2007-10-02T15:22:14Z2007-10-02T15:22:14Z2007-10-02T15:22:14Z2007-09-19http://hdl.handle.net/10012/3397Reference is the relation held to obtain between an expression and what a speaker or thinker intends the expression to represent. Reference is a component of interpretation, the process of giving terms, sentences, and thoughts semantic content. An example of reference in a formal context involves the natural numbers, where each one can be taken to have a corresponding set-theoretic counterpart as its referent. In an informal context reference is exemplified by the relation between a name and the specific name-bearer when a speaker or thinker utters or has the name in mind. Recent debates over reference have concerned the mechanism of reference: How is it that we can refer? In informal contexts, externalists see the reference relation as explicable in terms of the salient causal relations involved in the naming of a thing, or a class of things, and the ensuing causal chains leading to a term’s use. Opponents of this view—internalists—see the reference relation as being conceptually direct, and they take the external approach to rely on untenable metaphysical assumptions about the world’s structure. Moreover, some internalists take the permutability—i.e. the consistent reinterpretation—of certain referential schemes to confound the externalist picture of reference. In this thesis I focus on the reference of theoretical terms in science, and I argue for an externalist treatment of natural kinds and other theoretical elements. Along the way I offer a defense of the externalist’s pre-theoretic metaphysical assumptions and emphasize their central role in the interpretation of scientific languages. The externalist approach acknowledges the necessary constraints on reference-fixing that account for the schemes we employ, and this, I argue, confounds the permutation strategy.enreferencecausal theory of referencenatural kindsexternalismcausalitymodel-theoretic argumentReference and ReinterpretationThesis or DissertationPhilosophyMaster of ArtsPhilosophy
collection NDLTD
language en
sources NDLTD
topic reference
causal theory of reference
natural kinds
externalism
causality
model-theoretic argument
Philosophy
spellingShingle reference
causal theory of reference
natural kinds
externalism
causality
model-theoretic argument
Philosophy
Kulic, Anthony
Reference and Reinterpretation
description Reference is the relation held to obtain between an expression and what a speaker or thinker intends the expression to represent. Reference is a component of interpretation, the process of giving terms, sentences, and thoughts semantic content. An example of reference in a formal context involves the natural numbers, where each one can be taken to have a corresponding set-theoretic counterpart as its referent. In an informal context reference is exemplified by the relation between a name and the specific name-bearer when a speaker or thinker utters or has the name in mind. Recent debates over reference have concerned the mechanism of reference: How is it that we can refer? In informal contexts, externalists see the reference relation as explicable in terms of the salient causal relations involved in the naming of a thing, or a class of things, and the ensuing causal chains leading to a term’s use. Opponents of this view—internalists—see the reference relation as being conceptually direct, and they take the external approach to rely on untenable metaphysical assumptions about the world’s structure. Moreover, some internalists take the permutability—i.e. the consistent reinterpretation—of certain referential schemes to confound the externalist picture of reference. In this thesis I focus on the reference of theoretical terms in science, and I argue for an externalist treatment of natural kinds and other theoretical elements. Along the way I offer a defense of the externalist’s pre-theoretic metaphysical assumptions and emphasize their central role in the interpretation of scientific languages. The externalist approach acknowledges the necessary constraints on reference-fixing that account for the schemes we employ, and this, I argue, confounds the permutation strategy.
author Kulic, Anthony
author_facet Kulic, Anthony
author_sort Kulic, Anthony
title Reference and Reinterpretation
title_short Reference and Reinterpretation
title_full Reference and Reinterpretation
title_fullStr Reference and Reinterpretation
title_full_unstemmed Reference and Reinterpretation
title_sort reference and reinterpretation
publishDate 2007
url http://hdl.handle.net/10012/3397
work_keys_str_mv AT kulicanthony referenceandreinterpretation
_version_ 1716599889453907968